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ABSTRACT
Since the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda members against the United States,
counterterrorism has become a top priority for policymakers and academic
researchers. A critical aspect of this mandate is the prevention and intervention
of future terrorist attacks by U.S.-based jihadist and Salafist extremists. This
study aims to generate a typology of homegrown terrorists who have been
prosecuted by the United States federal government for terrorism offenses within
the United States since the 9/11 attacks. The current study uses a sample of 115
cases, involving 194 offenders.
Three clusters of offenders who share a set of demographic, social, and
behavioral characteristics were identified through a two-step cluster analysis.
These clusters include: Cyber Attackers, Convert Affiliates, and Trained Allies.
Clusters also exhibited variation in the nature of terrorist activity and degree of
operational success. The unique characteristics of each cluster suggest possible
policy implications for international travel, cyber regulation, and community
outreach programs to address the unique threats posed by subgroups of
offenders. Efforts to prevent future terrorist plots and attacks may be more
effective if the type of offender is considered.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Background
The September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks resulting in nearly 3,000
deaths and billions of dollars in financial losses was the worst terrorist attack in
American history. Since then, the United States government has made
counterterrorism a top priority. While the threat from foreign-based operatives
continues, a growing concern among scholars and practitioners alike has been
the analysis and interdiction of homegrown terrorism involving citizens and
residents of the United States. While homegrown extremist movements range
across a wide variety of ideologies, which include racist, anti-government, and
animal liberation movements, this study examines jihadist and Salafist extremists
who reside in the United States. This research focus springs from a documented
change in terrorist operational and recruitment strategy. In addition to
orchestrated attacks by operatives, Al Qaeda and related movements now have
a bifurcated strategy of inspiring radical Islamic American citizens and residents
outside of their command structure to undertake terrorist attacks within the
United States. These individuals and cells, such as the April 2013 Boston
Marathon assailants, are the focus of this analysis.
Key components of the counterterrorism effort by law enforcement include
not only undercover informants and intelligence gathering, but offender analysis
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as well. Identifying the common characteristics of individuals who were
radicalized into violent Islamist ideology will aid efforts to not only detect plots,
but will ultimately prevent attacks against the United States. Understanding more
about the type of individuals who become homegrown terrorists will generate
policy implications that extend beyond the immediate strategic concerns
associated with investigating terrorist threats to prevention strategies that can be
deployed by customs and immigration services, integrated into community
outreach and partnership efforts, and incorporated into web-based surveillance.

Statement of the Problem
Homegrown plots and attacks by Islamic radicals represent the most
frequent terrorist incidents in the post September 11 period and pose a unique
threat to law enforcement (U.S. House, Committee on Homeland Security, 2012).
While Al Qaeda and its affiliates still seek to directly attack American targets,
they have broadened their strategy to include not only their own foreign-based
members to launch operations, but non-member sympathizers already present in
the United States. Individuals are now being radicalized by Islamic ideology
through interaction with: experienced extremists, the Internet, social media
websites, recruiters stationed in the United States, and interaction with
radicalized inmates in prison (U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, 2012).
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The presence of homegrown terrorists already residing in the United
States presents an acute vulnerability to the American homeland. Estimates of
the number of homegrown Islamic plots occurring within the United States since
9/11 range from 63 to 188. These estimates vary widely due to case inclusion
criteria and differences in how terrorism is defined (Bergen, Lebovich, Petruso,
Rowland, & Greenwald, 2012; Bjelopera, 2013; Jenkins, 2010; Southern Poverty
Law Center, 2011). Given the critical threat posed by U.S.-based attacks, it is
critical to generate a well-constructed definition to identify relevant cases so as to
better understand the nature of this problem.
In the current study, three criteria were used to identify cases. First,
offenses were classified as incidents of homegrown terrorism based on the
citizenship status of the main perpetrators. Homegrown terrorists are individuals
who act against their home nation, both through domestic and foreign criminal
terrorist behavior. This includes any prosecuted case involving:
the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or
individual, based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto
Rico, committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance
of political, social, religious, or ideological objectives. (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, n.d.; White, 2006)
By narrowing case selection to those incidents that occurred within the United
States (second criteria) and not at locations of U.S. jurisdiction abroad (e.g., a
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military base), the results will lend themselves more directly to developing local
interdiction policies. Finally, it is important to consider a wider range of activity
that was studied previously. When studies include a broad range of terrorist
behavior—e.g., attacks, attempted attacks, plots, and material support to terrorist
organizations--more information is available to support developing a policyoriented typology.

Purpose of the Study
This study examines homegrown Islamic extremists who were prosecuted
since September 11, 2001 with the intent of developing an offender typology that
differentiates subgroups of offenders based on a unique set of personal, social,
and criminal behavioral characteristics. While extensive terrorism literature
exists, little work has been done in the area of developing a typology of
homegrown terrorists. Moreover, while the extant literature depicts how terrorist
plots are intercepted, no one has of yet used incident details to help generate a
profile of homegrown terrorists. It is argued that a clearer understanding of the
different groups of individuals involved in homegrown terrorism can be derived
from using information drawn from all homegrown terrorist cases, including both
plots and attacks. Being more inclusive in selecting cases to use when
developing an offender typology stands to generate a more comprehensive
typology than what is currently available. In turn, the resulting classification
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system may offer a clearer direction for developing post-event investigation
techniques and strategies to prevent future incidents on the American homeland.

Importance of the Study
Homegrown Islamic radicals, who have plotted and successfully attacked
the United States, as well as those individuals who provide material support to
terrorism, pose a significant threat to the United States. Radicalization of U.S.based individuals widens resources available to terrorist organizations, even
when there is no intent to foment specific violent jihadist plots (Bjelopera, 2013,
p. 29). For example, Cedric Carpenter and Lamont Ranson were prosecuted for
providing material support when they sold illegal driver licenses, birth certificates,
and social security cards to people they thought were members of a foreign
terrorist organization, Abu Sayyaf (Bjelopera, 2013, p. 31). There is also subset
of homegrown terrorists who are radicalized in the United States prior to
undertaking travel overseas for military training and operational support. These
radicalized individuals have successfully communicated with terrorist
organization officials while in the United States and have gained operational
support for their terrorist activity.
Just as scholars have not been able to devise a demographic profile of
homegrown terrorists, neither has there been a conclusive set of factors able to
predict radicalization. Many channels exist (e.g., social experiences, family ties,
foreign travel, and religion) and they may all play a role in the radicalization
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process. Including radicalization channels in the analysis may yield a set of
common traits or behaviors that are operationally useful for prevention to
both government and moderate religious communities. Some of these may
be “pre-radicalization” (Bjelopera, 2013. p. 13) factors, which federal and state
law enforcement, in collaboration with communities, can use to detect, monitor,
and ultimately prevent criminality.
Terrorism enforcement and counterterrorism measures result in a
tremendous expenditure of taxpayer dollars. For example, The Human Rights
Watch organization reported that it costs approximately $27,251 annually to
detain one individual in federal prison (Rona, 2012). In comparison, the
estimated cost of a major homegrown terrorism case, U.S. v Batiste et al.,
involving a six-person plot to bomb Chicago's Willis Tower and government
buildings in South Florida exceeded $10 million dollars (Munzenrieder, 2009). In
addition, it is estimated that billions of dollars have been expended
for counterterrorism efforts and congressional oversight (Congressional Budget
Office, 2012).
A closer look into the specific demographic, social, and behavioral
characteristics of U.S.-based offenders, stands to reveal patterns in these
offenders’ lives. By doing so, this study will contribute materially to the growing
body of scholarship dedicated to uncovering risk factors for radicalization, as well
as the work aimed at developing prevention strategies to combat homegrown
terrorism. However, a cautionary note is in order. Given the specificity of the
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inclusion criteria used, this examination is limited to offenders based in the
United States and cannot be applied to foreign-based operatives.

Thesis Outline
Chapter two provides an overview of the literature describing homegrown
terrorism. Of particular relevance are those studies analyzing case details, as
well as offender demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics. The
discussion will also present estimates of the number of terrorist plots, attempted
attacks, successful attacks, and instances of material support to terrorism
targeting the United States by U.S.-based individuals.
Chapter three describes the methods and analysis. This study collected
information about individual defendants involved in homegrown terrorism crimes
that resulted in indictments, pleas, or convictions from prosecutions by the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) that occurred or were processed post
September 11, 2001 to March 2014. Individuals being tried in proceedings
originating out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that involved foreign enemy
combatants prosecuted in military tribunals were excluded. Only individuals who
are U.S. citizens, permanent residents, or those who have resided in the U.S. for
at least five years irrespective of their legal status were included in this study.
The final sample included approximately 194 offenders. The selected cases
included plots, attacks, and cases of material support to terrorist organizations.
Cluster analysis was then used to identify groups of homogeneous offenders who
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shared similar case details and demographic, social, and behavioral
characteristics.
Chapter four presents the results of the study. This study hypothesized
that clusters of terrorists who have attacked within the United States since 9/11
would not align fully with the three tier categories of homegrown terrorists found
by Thachuk, Bowman, and Richardson (2008). Instead, it was hypothesized that
several subgroups would emerge that differentiated offenders based on type of
involvement (e.g., material support, plotting, or successful attack) and group
affiliation (e.g., Al Qaeda compared to other groups). It was argued that each
cluster would exhibit a distinct set of characteristics drawn from each of the four
categories of case and offender characteristics.
This study found that while three subgroups exist within the homegrown
offender pool, each exhibiting a unique configuration of case details,
demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics, the clusters did not align
with the level of involvement in terrorist activity or formal group affiliation. The
study found three clusters of offenders. Those clusters were Cyber Attackers,
Convert Affiliates, and Trained Allies. These distinctive groups of offenders
signals a typology of homegrown terrorists that have plotted, attempted to attack,
attacked, and provided material support to terrorist organizations against the
United States. The typology signals policy implications to detect and prevent
future terrorist plots and attacks against the United States.
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Chapter five discusses the policy implications and limitations of the current
study. Specifically, the study suggests that certain preventative measures can be
implemented to avoid future terrorist attacks, such as community outreach
programs between mental health services, law enforcement, and community
services. Moreover, the study indicates that it is necessary to closely monitor
international travel and cyber activity that is associated with radicalization
channels. Suggestions for the improvement of future research are also
presented, such as a more detailed examination of mental health issues and
whether certain mental illnesses, when seen in combination with other
circumstances, predispose individuals to be influenced by radicalization efforts.
This line of inquiry would also benefit from future studies that aim to identify
precursor behavior that leads to terrorist activity. At the end of this paper, two
appendices are provided to describe the variables and references used in this
study.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
After the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda, violent jihadist terrorist plots and
attacks became a primary concern for agencies involved in law enforcement and
national security. Homegrown terrorism also became a research focus for
political, legal, and criminological scholars. While terrorist incidents appeared to
have peaked in 2009, the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings illustrate that the
threat to the American homeland continues. “The Congressional Research
Service (CRS) estimates there have been 63 homegrown violent jihadist plots
and attacks since 9/11, with 42 of those occurring from 2009 to 2012” (Bjelopera,
2013, p. 1).
According to various scholars and congressional officials, homegrown
terrorism is a growing threat, due to increased radicalization of homegrown
individuals and the proliferation of plots and attacks against the United States
that originate within the country (Jenkins, 2010; Pregulman & Burke, 2012; U.S.
Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008;
Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). U.S. officials routinely warn about the nature of the
terrorist threat against the homeland. Attorney General Eric Holder, stated the
“…United States is facing multidimensional threats which ought to be seen in
context of a much more varied and longstanding threat picture,” at a 2010 News
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Conference after the attempted Times Square Bomb in New York City by Faisal
Shazhad (as stated in Mantri, 2011, p. 89). In 2011, the Committee on Homeland
Security in the U.S. House of Representatives, held four hearings to stress the
present threat by Al Qaeda’s radicalization efforts among Muslim-Americans
(Kurzman, 2012).
A key area of concern involves those cases in which terrorist propaganda
or extremist associates have radicalized U.S. citizens, residents, and domiciled
visitors. Al Qaeda and its affiliates have evolved beyond their original hierarchical
operational structure to a multi-channel operation that includes the dissemination
of propaganda and training materials through Internet blogs, radical websites,
social networking sites, and jihadist literature (Lahoud et al., 2012). While
scholars are beginning to investigate homegrown terrorism, a detailed typology of
offenders that can be used to craft effective intervention strategies is lacking.
This is partially due to the variety of definitions used for homegrown terrorism
and the sometimes-limited availability of defendant information.
Prior attempts to produce a succinct profile or typology of homegrown
terrorists have failed to identify policy relevant patterns. For instance, it has been
found that many of these individuals are male, in their 20s at the time of arrest,
and U.S. citizens (Kurzman, Schanzer, & Moosa, 2011). Some scholars, such as
Thachuk et al. (2008), argue that homegrown Islamic terrorists fall into one of
three categories based mainly on citizenship status: legal or illegal immigrants,
second and third generation Muslims, and converts to Islam (p. 2). However,
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homegrown terrorists differ in social circumstances, with variations in their
occupation, education, and criminal history, among other factors. Other scholars
have examined paths of radicalization, in attempting to determine what makes a
homegrown individual become a terrorist (see for example Silber and Bhatt,
2007). Three radicalization channels are thought to exist; recruitment by terrorist
officials, self-radicalization, and exposure to Islamic propaganda on the Internet.
However, these paths are not mutually exclusive. More information needs to be
collected to identify whether different channels, and combinations thereof, reach
unique groups of people. In sum, while the existing literature describes how
terrorist plots are intercepted, a working typology of homegrown terrorists
remains elusive. Two factors contributing to the limited success of prior studies
are that a) they used a small set of predictor variables, and b) a lack of robust
analytic techniques to identify subgroups within the population.
This chapter will introduce what is currently known about offenders
involved in homegrown terrorist plots against the United States from post 9/11 to
March 2014. After summarizing the demographic and social characteristics of
offenders, this chapter reviews the behavioral characteristics thought to be
associated with homegrown terrorist activity, such as existence of a criminal
record, involvement with a radicalized group, being a religious leader,
international travel, access to weapons and other materials, and conversion to
Islam. The chapter will then discuss how Al Qaeda influences U.S. persons
through various radicalization and recruiting channels; including the Internet,
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extremist propaganda, and terrorist training, among others. This will then lead
into a short discussion of the general strain theory because there is some
suggestion that suffering different types of strain may prime a person toward
being receptive to radicalization. Next the literature review will discuss how
defining terrorism affects efforts to identify relevant cases when examining
homegrown terrorism and how this contributes to the inability of prior scholars to
craft a useful typology. Finally, the research questions and hypotheses are listed.

Terrorist Characteristics
Demographic, Social, and Behavioral Characteristics
There is no single demographic profile for Muslim American terrorist
suspects and perpetrators (Kurzman, 2012; Kurzman et al., 2011). Kurzman,
Schanzer, and Moosa (2011) found that over half of the Muslim-American
suspects were in their 20s at the time of their arrest, the majority were U.S.
citizens, and came from a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds. In their analysis,
Kurzman et al. (2011) found that only one of the perpetrators was a female, but
because she was involved in international terrorism she was not considered a
homegrown individual.
Kurzman (2012) found that ethnicity ranged from African American, Arab,
Somali, South Asian, White, and other. While there were no dominant ethnicities,
there was an absence of Somali Americans compared to previous years. In a
subsequent analysis, Kurzman (2013) studied Muslim American perpetrators in
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2012 and compared the findings to a prior study: the demographics did not differ
greatly.
Kurzman (2013) found that 35 percent of all the Muslim American
perpetrators since 9/11 were converts to Islam. Moreover, Kurzman (2013) found
no common educational level among the perpetrators. The same was true for
occupation; they ranged from working class individuals to unemployed
individuals. It is important to note that these findings only apply to the offenders
of plots and attacks. Kurzman (2013) does not discuss the ethnicity, occupation,
education, and other relevant characteristics of those who provided material
support to terrorist organizations.
Thachuk et al. (2008) generated a typology of homegrown terrorist
individuals that includes three categories. First, there is the category of
immigrants who have come to the United States for a more prosperous life.
These individuals are young and tend to pursue a college education. These
immigrants enter the United States with some kind of permit or through illegal
means.
The second category is the second generation, U.S. citizen and non-U.S.
citizen, children and grandchildren of the first category adults. These individuals
are also second and third generation Muslims who are following their parents’
religion. Thachuk et al. (2008) claims these individuals can feel, at times, as
outcasts within their new home. As a result, some of these individuals feel
confused within both cultures; the cultural they were raised in and the newly
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acquired American culture. In addition, it is at the time of alienation that these
second and third generation Muslims feel it necessary to protect Islam from nonMuslims. As a result, this may be the trigger point in which they commit violent
acts against the United States.
The last category consists of individuals who decide to convert to Islam.
Those that convert do not usually come from a Muslim community or family. They
convert to Islam to find religious ideology, marital status, or guidance from others
(Thachuk, Bowman & Richardson, 2008). Many times they convert while in
prison. For example, there is the case of Hispanic American, Jose Padilla, who
was recruited into Islam while serving a prison sentence in Miami (Vidino, 2009).
Many times, authorities are unable to distinguish converts since they are
instructed not to alter their appearance and blend in with their community
(Thachuk et al., 2008).
In comparison to Thachuk et al.’s (2008) categories of terrorists, Vidino’s
(2009) analysis of homegrown jihadist terrorism in the past 30 years further
distinguishes homegrown cases by the number of players in the attempted or
carried out attack, by placing them into clusters and lone wolves. Clusters are
those who are native or immigrants to the U.S. for a long period of time and have
formed their terrorist group within the U.S. Lone wolves work by themselves
without any direct guidance from terrorist leaders (Vidino, 2009).
An example of a well-known cluster was the “Lackawanna Six,” who were
sentenced in December 2003 after being trained in Afghanistan by Al Qaeda
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(Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Division, 2007). The members
of the Lackawanna Six were all U.S. naturalized citizens of Yemini descent
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Division, 2007). There was
also the Portland Seven cluster that provided support to the Taliban in
Afghanistan (Vidino, 2009). An example of a lone wolf homegrown terrorist is that
of Derrick Shareef who attempted to buy grenades to bomb a shopping mall in
Chicago and was arrested after talking to a federal informant (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2007).
In his analysis of 20 case studies of homegrown terrorism who were
affiliated, but not members of Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
Alexander (2011) found that nearly all the plotters were men, many were
converts to Islam, and not born in the United States. Further, Alexander (2011)
found that some had a criminal history, varying degrees of education, and
differed in their marital and parental statuses.
Those offenders that were successful in killing people on U.S. soil during
their attack worked alone and used a handgun on their targets (Alexander, 2011;
Jenkins, 2010). These cases were that of Hadayat, Haq, and Bledose. Alexander
(2011) notes that the individuals involved in these 20 case studies were mostly
influenced by available material online or in some other indirect manner.
Moreover, these individuals did not receive any formal training and lacked the
skills to carry out these attacks. It did not take more than some mere planning
and execution from the offenders.
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In another study, by the NYPD, Silber and Bhatt (2007) found that most of
the homegrown terrorists were men, although an increase of female terrorists
was noted. However, the role of women in terrorist operations was not as
attacker or plotter but as a supporter. Additionally, the average age of individuals
was less than 35. Silber and Bhatt (2007) specifically point to the characteristics
of these individuals that would make them unnoticeable to law enforcement and
Americans surrounding them: they look like any other citizen, are involved in their
community, and have ordinary jobs (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Lastly, Silber and
Bhatt (2007) found that these terrorists tend to be second and third generation
immigrants living in the United States. This compliments the characteristics that
Thachuk et al. (2008) describes within the three categories of homegrown
terrorists. Again, it is important to note that the analysis done by Silber and Bhatt
(2007) does not include all cases of homegrown terrorism. The authors decided
to include only five total plots in order to study the radicalization and
characteristics of these homegrown terrorists more closely.

Terrorism and the Internet
Radicalization
Homegrown terrorists often use basic tools found on the Internet to
facilitate and support their terrorist operations. With the increased use of the
Internet, homegrown individuals no longer have to await recruitment or specific
instructions in plotting attacks against the United States. Terrorist organizations,
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like Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab, are taking advantage of the Internet to influence
recruits. Al Qaeda and other terrorist propaganda is readily available to access,
share, and self-radicalize homegrown individuals. Scholars conclude that this
online propaganda and cyber jihadism, allows radicalized individuals to create
various social platforms to preach their ideology and follow the ideology of
others.
Thachuk et al. (2008) state “[T]he Internet allows groups to create and
identify dedicated insiders—and to maintain fervor in those already dedicated to
the cause—on a global scale” (p. 3). It also provides an opportunity for
individuals to self-radicalize, such as naturalized citizen, Samir Khan, who was
able to easily create Islamic propaganda on the Internet (Thachuk et al., 2008).
Khan, who was eventually killed in Yemen, did not have to leave his house to
radicalize others and give advice on how to fight jihad over the Internet.
The following are just some examples of homegrown terrorists who have
used the different mechanisms of the Internet to support their terrorist attacks
and plots.
• Mohamed Osman Mohamud used Google street view to survey his target
location in Portland, Oregon (Pregulman & Burke, 2012).
• Tarek Mehanna and co-conspirators, who were charged with terrorism,
translated terrorist propaganda from Arabic to English and shared them
on violent Islamic websites (Bjelopera, 2013).
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• Samir Khan eventually became an editor of Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine,
which includes articles on bomb-making instructions and methods to
murder Americans. (U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, 2012).
Terrorist organizations no longer restrict their ideological websites, forums,
or blogs from the public. Homegrown terrorists can now search for others who
are seeking the same guidance or find others to ultimately conspire against the
United States. For example, social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook
are used to post jihadist speeches and share links to other Islamic websites and
other terrorism content. These social media platforms also allow other likeminded individuals to “like” or repost content, therefore spreading the popularity
of the specific user and its content on a much faster and larger scale. For
instance, al-Shabaab’s rap video on YouTube, Blow By Blow, discussed the
history of the fight for jihad (U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, 2012). As of May 22, 2014, the Blow by Blow video has
had a total of 21,623 views on YouTube (AbuAyrow, 2009).
Al Qaeda no longer restricts its recruitment efforts to foreign language
speakers. For example, in 2007, the terrorist organization made an effort to make
their online materials more accessible by posting in English and adding subtitles
to its videos (U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 2008). In addition, speeches by terrorist leaders, such as al-Zawahiri,
appeals to U.S.-based jihadist individuals by directly calling on “…blacks in
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America, people of color, American Indians, Hispanics, and all other
oppressed…” (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 2008, p. 7). Radicalized individuals do not necessarily have to travel
abroad for training due to the large array of YouTube videos and online literature.
In an analysis of YouTube jihadist channels, Klausen, Barbieri, ReichlinMelnick, and Zelin (2012) found that in a period of three months, 41 YouTube
accounts were found with jihadist content. More specifically, these accounts
resembled extremist propaganda of a British banned terrorist organization, alMuhajiroun, but nonetheless inspired by Al Qaeda. Their study concluded that all
41 accounts were separate channels but, in fact, they were organized and
controlled by al-Mujahiroun. Klausen et al. (2012) notes that this kind of
multiplicity of YouTube channels is an effort to create more busy work, and
ultimately to drain more law enforcement resources, as there is a larger amount
of material to sift through and attempt to delete. An investigative report by the
U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2012)
states that there is a rising trend in computer literacy among radicalized
individuals and that many use the Internet in furtherance of their terrorist
activities.
Scholars have not found a specific path to radicalization (Silber & Bhatt,
2007). Instead, it has been found that individuals may radicalize due to different
events, social influences, or dramatic experiences throughout their lives. Some
examples of avenues of radicalization are interaction with terrorist organization
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members or recruiters, self-radicalization through the Internet and Islamic
literature, peer influences, overseas travel, and incarceration (U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008). Internet use,
specifically the availability of propaganda material, recruitment content, and
videos on social networking sites draw connections to radicalization means for
homegrown offenders. These radicalization factors point to social activity
signaling specific use of the Internet in furtherance of terrorist activity. Similarly,
negative experiences or life events may also lead toward terrorist behavior.

Strain
Just as the path to radicalization is not concrete, there is no specific path
to criminality either. However, studies have supported Robert Agnew’s (1992)
general strain theory, which defines three types of strain or pressures that
individual’s experience, which can lead to delinquency in attempting to cope with
those strains. Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory is based on the idea that
when people experience negative life events they are more inclined to engage in
criminal activity. There are three major types of strain; the individual’s inability to
achieve desired goals, the loss of meaningful relationships or valuables, and the
unforeseen negative experiences (Agnew, 1992).
Agnew (1992) found that individuals who failed to achieve positively
valued goals, such as financial prosperity, status and respect, and autonomy are
more apt to get involved in criminal behavior. Those individuals who are not able
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to attain these achievements under normal circumstances resort to crime to
achieve them due to its importance in their life. The loss of positively valued
stimuli can also cause strain. Loss refers to a broken relationship with a friend or
a theft of a valued object, like a car. This then leads the individual to delinquency
because he or she attempts to prevent the loss, retrieve what has been taken
away, or seeks revenge for what has happened. Lastly, presentation of negative
stimuli refers to abuse, negative school experiences, homelessness, and others.
These negative experiences may lead individuals to break the law in order to
escape such situations.
Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory is reflected in a more specific
example of negative experiences faced by individuals that may lead to
delinquency, such as injustices in the criminal justice system and its procedures.
For example, homegrown terrorists may feel that law enforcement’s questioning
and scrutiny of their religious ideology as unjust and thus may revenge against or
engage in criminal activity. Scheuereman (2013) examined the effects of
interactional, procedural, and distributive injustices and delinquency. The study
indicated a likelihood of violence when the offenders experienced procedural
injustice. The individuals of the study expected the procedures to be consistent
across all cases, non-bias decisions, and fairness for all those involved.
Instances in which procedural justice was present, the individuals felt no control
over the situation, since it was believed no one was at an advantage over anyone
else.
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Moreover, if procedural injustice is present, the individual feels anger,
resentment, and betrayal leading to violent activity. The study found that when
individuals experienced procedural injustice, they were 2.40 times more likely to
respond violently to the situation than if they experienced any of the other two
injustices (Scheuerman, 2013, p. 380). These findings support Agnew’s (1992)
general strain theory in which individuals may seek revenge or feel betrayal from
their inability to cope with the experienced strain and therefore commit criminal
offenses.
Scheuerman’s (2013) study can be applied to individuals who convert to
Islam while they are incarcerated, who then engage in acts of terrorism. These
individuals may feel anger, resentment, or betrayal by the criminal justice system
when initially prosecuted for other crimes. It may well be the case that these
individuals who were convicted, felt betrayed by their country, resorted to other
Muslim inmates and Islam ideology for guidance and revenge against the United
States. Procedural injustices can indicate precursors to terrorist activity by U.S.
offenders.

Al Qaeda Presence in the United States
As discussed previously, Al Qaeda is now made up of various cells and
individuals who seek to attack the United States. The number of Al Qaeda
operational groups continues to increase, Thachuk et al. (2008) report 40 and
counting since January 2005. Al Qaeda has increasingly used the Internet to
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reach recruits in the United States. According to Pregulman and Burke (2012),
Al Qaeda may soon choose to virtually train their recruits due to the enormous
volumes of online propaganda available to homegrown individuals who follow
their ideology.
U.S. officials are now referring to Al Qaeda inspired plots and attacks as
franchised terrorism due to Osama bin Laden’s decentralization leadership since
the beginning of the war on terrorism in 1996. Al Qaeda depends, in part, on selfradicalized individuals already residing in the United States to commit violent
attacks. Since not all participants of Al Qaeda in the United States directly
communicate with Al Qaeda, Sageman (2008) refers to them as wannabes of a
new social movement. As previously discussed, these individuals turn to
available electronic literature and propaganda for guidance. Due to Al Qaeda’s
changing organizational structure, Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman disagree
on whether the threat stems from radicalized participants who meet and plot on
the Internet or from Al Qaeda organization members (Sciolino & Schmitt, 2008).
Ultimately, Al Qaeda remains a terrorist organization with flexibility in
both recruiting and operational tactics in fighting the United States.

Capturing the Extent of Homegrown Terrorism
The literature previously discussed provides some insight into the
characteristics of individuals who commit acts of homegrown terrorism against
the United States. A common profile of homegrown terrorists has not been
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established from current research, although some common demographic
characteristics have been found among them, such as U.S. citizenship, in their
20s at time of arrest, mostly men; variations are present among offender
demographics (Kurzman et al., 2011). One scholar, Thachuk et al. (2008) has
categorized homegrown terrorist individuals into three different categories,
ranging from alienated first generation immigrants to socially isolated converts to
Islam that decide to act against the United States. While Thachuk et al. (2008)
offer a useful starting point, a more detailed typology may be constructed by
analyzing a broad set of homegrown individuals that commit acts of terrorism
within the United States.
Defining Homegrown Terrorism
There are many definitions for homegrown terrorism. The definitions vary
across law enforcement agencies as well as throughout studies conducted by
academia. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “the
unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives” (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
n.d.). More specifically, in their 2002-2005 terrorism publication, the FBI defined
domestic terrorism as:
the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or
individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto
Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to
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intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives. (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Counterterrorism Division, 2007)
The DOJ, National Security Division, which prosecutes terrorism cases, defines
domestic terrorism as:
acts within the U.S. that are dangerous to human life, violate federal or
state criminal laws, have no actual connection to international terrorists,
and appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
influence domestic government policy through intimidation or coercion, or
affect the conduct of our government by mass destruction, assassination
or kidnapping. (U.S. Department of Justice, Offices of the United States
Attorneys, n.d.).
White (2006) discusses the complexity of defining terrorism due to
controversy in its application and contradictions among the legal statutes.
Definitions of terrorism often vary based on the agency’s priorities and mission
objectives. Some definitions are more specific than others, encompass a larger
group of people than others, and address different dimensions in each. Hoffman
(1998) notes that the FBI’s definition of terrorism, unlike the State Department’s
definition, addresses the psychological dimension of the terrorist act since it
acknowledges those actions in which the individual intimidates or uses coercive
measures towards their target. Nonetheless, Hoffman (1998) notes that the
Department of Defense’s definition of terrorism is the most complete because it

26

highlights the threats of terrorism as much as the acts of violence and considers
the religious, ideological, and political objectives of the offense. Similar to the
complexity of defining terrorism, variations occur when defining homegrown
terrorism.
Most law enforcement agencies, like the FBI, use their domestic terrorism
definitions to encompass homegrown terrorism. While an act of homegrown
terrorism usually has some religious, ideological, or political objective in mind, it
is the particular offender, target, and location of the violent act that distinguishes
this specific type of terrorism. The Center for Strategic and International Studies
defines homegrown terrorism as “extremist violence perpetrated by U.S citizens
or legal U.S. residents, and linked to or inspired by Al Qaeda’s brand of radical
Sunni Islamism” (Pregulman & Burke, 2012, p. 1). Bjelopera (2013) defines
homegrown terrorism as “terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United
States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors
radicalized within the United States” (Summary section, para. 1).
Consistency in defining homegrown terrorism would yield more robust
results across varying studies in academia and law enforcement alike, which
would then lead to improved policy implications. Lastly, a concrete definition of
homegrown terrorism and homegrown offenders would present researchers with
a mechanism to filter through terrorism cases in order to only include homegrown
terrorism attacks in their research.
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Deciding Which Cases to Include
According to various studies, the number of homegrown Islamic plots in
the United States in the post September 11 period ranges from 63 to 188 owing
to different definitions and inclusion criteria (Bergen et al., 2012; Bjelopera, 2013;
Jenkins, 2010; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011). These cases of terrorism
range from plots, attacks, attempted attacks, violent jihad training, and material
support to terrorist organizations. Similarly, the Heritage Foundation, which
conducts research on various disciplines, has kept track of terrorist plots since
the attacks of 9/11. In their latest report, the Heritage Foundation (Zuckerman,
Bucci, & Carfano, 2013) reported 60 terrorist plots and attacks against the United
States (See Figure 1. The number of terrorist plots and attacks, by year, from
2001 to 2013 in Appendix A). More specifically, 53 of those terrorist plots were
prevented before terrorists acted upon them, 4 were successful attacks, and 3
were prevented by civilians. Most importantly, 49 of these cases were
homegrown terrorist plots and attacks.
Dahl (2011) states there was an average of 9 plots per year (including
overseas and domestic extremist) from 2005 to 2009, the peak years. In 2010,
the number increased to 13, but that includes 2 overseas plots and a domestic
extremist plot (Dahl, 2011). Other scholars have tracked the number of
homegrown terrorist plots by Muslim Americans.
Kurzman’s (2011) study of Muslim-American terrorists found that Muslim
American suspects and perpetrators peaked in 2009, with an average of more
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than 40 per year compared to the average of 14 in prior years (para. 1). In 2012,
Kurzman found that Muslim-American terrorism had decreased in 2011.
Specifically, there were “20 Muslim Americans indicted for violent plots in 2011,
compared to 26 in 2010” (Kurzman, 2012, “Muslim-American Terrorism Down in
2011”, para. 1). In total, there were 193 indicted Muslim-Americans for violent
plots since 9/11 (Kurzman, 2012).
While Congressional officials have warned of a potential increase in plots
and attacks by Muslim Americans, evidence contradicts these claims. In the last
two years, there has been a decrease since the peak in 2009. Kurzman (2012)
found that this decrease is due to the number of individuals successfully carrying
out attacks, rather than just plotting. In 2010, six Muslim Americans carried out
attacks, whereas in 2011, only one individual did; Yonathan Melaku (Kurzman,
2012). Melaku was prosecuted for a shooting incident at military buildings in
Virginia (Kurzman, 2012).
As discussed, research entities like the Heritage Foundation and The New
American Foundation, law enforcement agencies, and scholars have also kept a
record of terrorist attacks, but none have compiled a comprehensive data set of
acts of homegrown terrorism, to include both attacks and plots. For instance, The
Global Terrorism Database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) does not include those
instances where attacks were attempted but unsuccessful due to intervention by
authorities (Dahl, 2011). Also, the National Counterterrorism Center tracks
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incidents, but does not include plots that were never initiated or attempted (Dahl,
2011). While these agencies and organizations hold valuable information on
some terrorist incidents, they are not enough to get a complete picture of
homegrown terrorists acting against the United States.
In his study, Dahl (2011) examines unsuccessful terrorist plots since 1987
to October 2010, with a total of 176 attacks. However, only 103 were considered
domestic attacks, but those included right wing and antigovernment extremism.
Dahl’s (2011) findings do not give insight to the demographic characteristics of
the perpetrators involved in the attacks. Dahl’s (2011) research does not provide
an exact number of homegrown plots and attacks by U.S. persons within the
United States. Moreover, Dahl’s (2011) analysis does not include instances of
material support to terrorism by homegrown individuals.
Jenkins (2010) states there have been a “total of 46 cases of domestic
radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism” (Preface section, para. 2)
between September 2001 and 2009. Those incidents include domestic
individuals who were accused of providing material support and those who
traveled overseas. “While incidents of homegrown terrorism decreased slightly in
2011 from their peak in 2009 and 2010, such acts continue to occur with
disturbing frequency” (Pregulman & Burke, 2012, p. 2). Jenkins (2010) reports
there have been “more cases of radicalization in 2009 than any year since Sept
11, 2001” (p. 1).
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Homegrown terrorism has evolved into acts of violence committed by
American citizens, naturalized citizens, and those that have remained in the
United States for a long period of time. As Jenkins (2010) states, “America's
perception of the terrorist threat today differs greatly from the perception of 35
years ago (p. 25).” The 1970s was a unique decade for terrorism. Bombings on
U.S. soil represented American terrorism at the time. The current terrorism
experience is that of radicalized and non-radicalized individuals plotting and
carrying out terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. However, unlike the terrorists of 9/11,
homegrown terrorists are native to the country they are attacking and represent a
unique, yet diverse group of offenders.
A 2012 policy report by the Muslim Affairs Council reported a total of “135
plots by U.S. originated non-Muslim perpetrators against the United States since
9/11” (Beutel, 2012, p. 2), but that includes racist, anti-government, and animal
liberation movements related plots. Moreover, there have been “60 total plots by
U.S. and foreign-originated Muslim perpetrators since 9/11,” but that includes
both U.S. territory and abroad (Beutel, 2012, p. 4).
There have been more cases of material support to terrorist organizations
than actual terrorist attacks and plots (Thachuk et al., 2008; Kurzman, 2012). 18
United States Code (U.S.C.) Section (§) 2339A, providing material support to
terrorists is defined as “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation
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or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel” (Cornell University Law School, Legal
Information Institute, n.d.). According to Kurzman (2012), since 9/11, there have
been 462 Muslim Americans indicted for material support to terrorist
organizations, almost double of those for violent plots or attacks. However, this
figure must be taken with caution since it includes cases the FBI classified as
“terrorism-related” in 2010, although they did not involve terrorism charges
(Kurzman, 2012, “Support for Terrorism,” para. 2).
Hassan Moussa Makki, Sayed Mustajab Shah, and Earnest James
Ujaama are just a few of the homegrown terrorist individuals that have been
convicted of providing material support to terrorist organizations and other
charges. These individuals were involved in funding Hezbollah through cigarette
contraband and drug trafficking funds to support the Taliban (Thachuk et al.,
2008). It was noted in Kurzman’s (2012) study that, in recent cases, material
supporters handled a lesser volume of currency in their offenses. The largest
amount that has been seen was more than a million dollars and the lowest
amount was less than $100,000 (Kurzman, 2012). However, it should be noted
that the actual dollar amount involved is not known for all cases. It is difficult for
law enforcement to detect these individuals since they are not committing a
specific terrorist attack (Pregulman & Burke, 2012).
Unlike the inconsistent tracking of terrorist plots and attacks, there is a
more comprehensive account of successful terrorist attacks and associated
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casualties since 9/11. There have been a total of 33 fatalities since 9/11 from
successful plots and attacks (Kurzman, 2012). While the number of casualties
does not compare to the number of attempted and successful attacks, it remains
a concern for the American people and law enforcement personnel. Nonetheless,
variations of definitions of homegrown terrorism and differing criteria used
by scholars and law enforcement to determine homegrown individuals makes it
difficult to know the exact number of homegrown plots and attacks against the
United States since 9/11.
Due to the inconsistencies in the definition of terrorism, the number of total
homegrown terrorism plots is not concrete. Scholars and agencies have tracked
these incidents through different definitions and therefore the numbers do not
align with each other. Until all terrorist plots and attacks are examined by one
single definition, the true count of terrorist incidents will not be uncovered and
therefore be properly examined.

Research Aims and Hypotheses
Since past studies did not use a comprehensive set of cases and clear
inclusion criteria to examine only U.S. citizens, legal residents, and those who
have resided in the United States for a long period of time, efforts to generate a
useful offender typology have failed. It is also expected that broadening the list of
covariates will generate a more useful offender classification schema.
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Three research questions drive this study. First, this study sought to
determine whether all homegrown terrorist individuals fall within the three
categories found by Thachuk et al. (2008). And if not, is there sufficient evidence
that unique offender profiles could be generated among the individuals living in
the United States whom have engaged in homegrown terrorism activity? And
finally, is it possible to craft an offender typology that is specific enough to inform
interdiction strategies? Based on the literature reviewed, it is expected that these
questions would be tested with the following hypotheses.

1. Individuals residing in the United States who have been involved in
terrorist activity since 9/11 will not align fully with the 3 tier categories
of homegrown terrorists found by Thachuk et al. (2008).
2. Instead, it is hypothesized that the study will find several clusters, each
with a different set of characteristics drawn from each of the four
categories of case and offender characteristics (demographic, social,
and behavioral characteristics, as well as case details). These clusters
will align with:
a. Level of involvement, meaning that a unique profile will emerge for
individuals providing material support compared to those plotting
attacks, being unsuccessful at operationalizing a plan, and those
launching successful attacks.
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b. Type of group affiliation, meaning unique profiles will be evident for
Al Qaeda linked terrorists compared to other groups.
3. The offender subgroups will be distinct enough to generate unique
interdiction and crime prevention policy.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

Introduction
This study aimed to develop a typology of homegrown terrorists that can
support investigation efforts and will help generate effective prevention
strategies. This chapter begins with a description of the sampling process that
generated approximately 115 homegrown terrorism cases that were handled by
U.S. federal courts between September 11, 2011 and March 2014. Next, the
chapter reviews the data collection process used to obtain information about the
case details, demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics of those who
have chosen to plot, attack, attempted to attack, or have provided material
support to terrorist organizations. The chapter also presents the various types of
sources of information that were used and their completeness and reliability is
discussed. A description of the two-step cluster analysis used to generate the
typology is also presented. The chapter concludes with statistical representations
and descriptions of the bivariate correlations performed among the case details
and offender characteristics that were utilized in the study.

Sample
The sample was generated from 115 federal homegrown cases handled
by the U.S. Department of Justice since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11,
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2001. Cases were identified from existing lists of homegrown jihadist cases
compiled by various research organizations and federal law enforcement
agencies, such as the FBI, The Southern Poverty Law Center, The Heritage
Foundation, The New American Foundation, The Investigative Project on
Terrorism, and others. To supplement this list of cases, additional searches were
made using Google’s search engine using the following terms: “homegrown
terrorism cases,” “homegrown terrorism cases since 9/11,” “domestic terrorism
cases,” and “domestic jihadist terrorist cases.” All cases, with at least one
defendant that satisfies the definition of a homegrown terrorist were included in
the study.
The cases being examined generated approximately 194 individuals that
were involved in homegrown terrorism plots, attacks, attempted attacks, and
material support to terrorist organizations. Some of the cases involved multiple
offenders (up to 12), and in some cases multiple homegrown terrorist offenders.
Since some of the cases involved foreign-based individuals (non-U.S. persons),
the number of non-U.S. persons involved in each case was noted but individual
information was not collected. The sample did not include those defendants who
had their charges dismissed or those tried in state court. The sample excluded
trials originating out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that involved foreign enemy
combatants prosecuted in military tribunals.
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Data Collection
Information about defendants in these 115 cases was obtained through
publicly available sources, such as DOJ Press Releases, official court
documents, official government reports, government websites, research
organizations, and media articles and reports. The unit of analysis was the
offender: each offender was coded separately. In total, 34 variables were
constructed, this includes case details (5 variables) and offender characteristics
(29 variables) divided into: personal demographics (e.g., age, sex, citizenship,
ethnicity affiliation, education, etc.); social characteristics (e.g., reported religious
affiliation, former military experience, and radicalization to terrorism); strain
(failure to achieve positive valued goals, loss of positive valued stimuli, and
presence of negative stimuli); and behavioral characteristics (e.g., reported
criminal history, reported Imam leader, offender type, etc.) Described below (See
Appendix B for a complete list of variables), these variables were used for the
typology for two reasons: first, these characteristics are supported in the extant
literature as being key factors differentiating offenders; and second, these
variables represent the kind of information that would be easily available to law
enforcement throughout the course of a criminal investigation on terrorism.
Variables
Case Details. Five variables captured case details for each offense: type
of offense, terrorist organization affiliation, number of offenders involved, number
of U.S.-based co-conspirators, and number of co-conspirators who were non-
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U.S. persons. The type of offense was determined mainly by whether the
offender was able to carry out a plot or not, or if their crime was providing
material support to a terrorist organization. Therefore, description of offense was
coded as 1 = Material Support to Terrorism/Conspiracy to Provide Material
Support to Terrorism, 2 = Plot to Attack, 3 = Attempted Attack, and 4 =
Successful Attack. Terrorist organization affiliation refers to the specific terrorist
organization affiliated with the offense, coded as 1 = Al Qaeda, 2 = other, and 3 =
none. Details for the number of offenders, both U.S. persons and non-U.S.
persons were collected for each case. The number of offenders involved, number
of co-conspirators involved, and number of co-conspirators who were non-U.S.
persons were all coded as a continuous variable.
Demographic Characteristics. Nine variables captured demographic
characteristics: age, gender, citizenship status, immigrant generation, ethnicity,
education, occupation, reported marital status, and reported to have children.
The individual’s age was coded as a continuous variable by years old. Gender
was coded as simply 1 = male and 0 = female. Citizenship status at time of
offense/arrest will fall into one of five categories, based on legal status: 1 = U.S.
Citizen (U.S. born), 2 = Naturalized U.S. Citizen (non-U.S. born), 3 = Legal
Permanent Resident (LPR), 4 = Visa holder (student, tourist), or 5 =
undocumented (illegally residing in the country). The offender’s generation level
of immigrating to the United States was coded as 1 = 3rd generation, 2 = 2nd

39

generation, 3 = 1st generation. The offender’s ethnicity affiliation was recorded as
text, and then recoded as a social/cultural group or nation of origin.
The offender’s level of education was coded as 1 = less than high school,
2 = completed high school, 3 = technical school, non-college, 4 = some college, 5
= completed college (BA/BS), 6 = some graduate school, 7 = completed graduate
school (M.A.), or 8 = some/completed Doctorate (Ph.D.). The offender’s
occupation fell under three different categories. Those categories were 1 =
Professional (physicians, architect, teachers), 2 = Semi-Skilled (police, military,
mechanics, small business owners, and students), and 3 = Unskilled/None.
Reported marital status at the time of offense/arrest was coded as 1 = married or
0 = unmarried. Lastly, the reported to have children variable was coded as 1 = if
the offender had one or more children or 0 = if the offender was known to not
have any children.
Social Characteristics. Eight variables measured social characteristics:
reported religious affiliation, reported former military involvement/training,
reported suffering from or diagnosed mental illness, and five factors of terrorism
influence and radicalization means.
The offender’s reported religious affiliation was recorded as text. Reported
former military involvement or training within the United States was simply coded
as 1 = yes or 0 = No. Mental illness was coded using a scale computed by
summing the offender’s reported suffering from or diagnosed mental condition,
coded as 1 = for each condition or 0 = if none. The defendant was considered to
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have a mental illness history if at some point he or she received any psychiatric
care or was diagnosed with a mental illness prior to or during their criminal
proceedings. Those conditions are: 1) mental health issues, mentally troubled, or
mentally ill, 2) schizophrenia, 3) hallucinations, 4) bipolar disorder, 5,)
depression, 6) anxiety, and 7) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).
Terrorism influence and reported radicalization was coded as five different
variables. The first variable indicated whether the defendant was radicalized via
the Internet as 1 = yes or 0 = no. The remaining four variables specified the type
of radicalization means; social networking sites (ex: Facebook) 1 = yes or 0 = no,
extremist propaganda (ex: Inspire Magazine) 1 = yes or 0 = no, email or direct
contact with a terrorist official(s) 1 = yes or 0 = no, and overseas training with
terrorist organizations 1 = yes or 0 = no. To be coded as 1 for using a social
networking site, the defendant must have been influenced by speeches or other
material available by terrorist leaders via YouTube, Twitter, or other social
networking sites. Extremist propaganda refers to situations where defendants
were known to have read Muslim, jihadist, or other materials encouraging violent
acts against the United States. Lastly, overseas training captures overseas travel
for violent (jihad) training from terrorist organizations.
Strain. The amount of strain or stress the offender experienced in their life
was recorded using 3 factors: failure to achieve positive goals, loss of positive
experiences or acquisitions (positive valued stimuli), and the presentation of
negative experiences or losses (negative valued stimuli). All three were
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measured by summing the offender’s life events/occurrences in which they
experienced each type of strain. Failure to achieve positive goals was measured
using the following examples of strain: 1) acquisition of wealth, 2) status and
respect, and 3) autonomy. Loss of positive experiences or acquisitions was
measured using the following examples of strain: 1) death of friend/romantic
partner, 2) divorce, 3) separation, 4) theft of a valued object, 5) loss of a good
job, and 6) loss of a car for a period of time. Lastly, the presentation of negative
experiences or loss was measured using the following examples of strain: 1)
abusive parent, 2) boss who puts undue strain on individual, 3) parental
unemployment, 4) deaths in the family, 5) illnesses in the family, 6)
homelessness, and 7) economic hardship/poverty.
Behavioral Characteristics. Eight variables were used to measure
behavioral characteristics: reported criminal history, offender type, role of
offender within group, reported Imam leader, reported international travel,
instrumentality, convert to Islam, and prior religion before converting to Islam.
Criminal history was simply coded as 1 = having a criminal background or 0 = not
having a criminal background. The criterion for having a criminal background was
based on any prior arrests or convictions within the United States. The offender
type refers to the method in which the terrorist offense was carried out, 1 if
carried out alone or 2 if acted with others in a group. Additionally, the role of the
offender within the group was measured by and coded as 1 = leader or 2 = nonleader.
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Reported Imam leader was coded simply as 1 = yes or 0 = No. The
reported international travel variable was measured by indicating whether the
offender traveled outside of the United States in pursuit of guidance, training,
funding, etc. in furtherance of their offense. Reported international travel was
coded as 1 = yes or 0 = no. The instrumentality involved refers to the weapon the
offender actually used or had discussed to use in their terrorist operation. The
following categories captured the intended or actual use of materials during the
attack: 1 = weapons (e.g., handguns, WMD), 2 = general supplies, 3 =
explosives, 4 = safe houses and support (e.g., target lists, passports, driver’s
licenses, surveillance, etc.), 5 = funding, 6 = jihad training, and 7 = multiple
instrumentalities. Conversion to Islam/Muslim, was coded as 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Lastly, the offender’s prior religion before converting to Islam was recorded as
text.

Data Quality and Concerns
To ensure the most accurate information was used, sources were
assessed and data from the most highly ranked source was preferred. The
highest ranked data used in this study were official court documents. The data
was collected mainly from Department of Justice court documents, such as
indictments, criminal complaints, judgments, sentencing memorandums, and
others. Moreover, press releases were also examined to gather the necessary
information. Those instances in which the information was incomplete, that is, not
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all court documents are available; the researcher turned to media reports and
articles that discussed specific details and characteristics of the case and
offender(s) involved. Reporters can easily make mistakes when collecting
information for their journal articles and news reports. Since a different level of
investigatory rigor may be applied to each case, media sources are also apt to
suffer from reliability issues.
Media sources were essential to the data collection process since they
include specific details about the offender’s background that are not noted in the
legal documents. This information is often derived from interviews and other
sources of information, such as public records and previous publications of the
offenders’ achievements. Nonetheless, the offenders’ characteristics were
collected in order to have the most complete amount of information as possible.
The researcher only recorded information that was found credible and found
among multiple sources. That is, information that differed among sources was
not recorded. Therefore, the information had to match among the sources to be
recorded in the final coding of the variables. This was done to ensure the most
accurate information possible was collected and recorded.

Data Analysis Procedures
This study aimed to derive an offender typology useful for profiling
homegrown terrorists. The first step was to examine bivariate correlations among
event details and each set of characteristics. Following the bivariate coefficient
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correlations, two-step cluster analysis was conducted using all variables, except
immigrant generation. The aim of a cluster analysis was to partition offenders into
number of groups or clusters that were maximally similar or homogeneous with
respect to a number of selected variables. Specifically, the study utilized the twostep cluster method since both continuous and categorical variables were
collected.
In this cluster analysis, the log-likelihood distance was used to form
clusters. Clusters are identified with a process based on the reduction of the loglikelihood distance (Zhang, Ramakrishnon, & Livny, 1996; Chiu, Fang, Chen,
Wang, & Jeris, 2001). This means that groups are combined into clusters if a
decrease in log-likelihood is observed. This hierarchical clustering process
assumes normal distributions for continuous and multinomial categorical
variables (Zhang et al., 1996; Chiu et al., 2001). It is also assumed that the
variables are independent of each other. No missing values are allowed (Zhang
et al., 1996; Chiu et al., 2001); list wise deletion of cases occurred.
When conducting the two-step cluster analysis, the number of clusters
was set to be determined automatically with a maximum of 15 clusters. Lastly,
the Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC) was used to determine the number of
optimal clusters. Comparing ratio of change in successive analyses determines
whether merging groups and thus reducing the number of clusters improved the
fit of the model (Zhang et al., 1996; Chiu et al., 2001). Offense type and terrorist
affiliation variables were used to test/confirm the clusters. The final stage of
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analysis involved generating a cluster cross-tabulation with the results of the final
cluster classification for the two models: type of offense and terrorist affiliation.
The combination of these analyses generated unique offender subgroups. All
analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics version 21.

Description of the Sample
Case Details
Table 3.1 shows the type of offenses included in the sample along with the
terrorist affiliation of the defendants. Most cases involved situations where
offenders provided material support to terrorist organizations and the majority of
the individuals were affiliated with Al Qaeda (34.0 %).

Table 3.1
Description of Case Details
Variable

Valid Percent
(n)
(194)
64.4
29.4
4.6
1.5
(194)

Offense Type
Material Support to Terrorism
Plot to Attack
Attempted Attack
Successful Attack
Terrorist organization
affiliation
Al Qaeda
34.0
Other
43.8
None
22.2
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals
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%
Missing
0.0

0.0

Table 3.2 describes the number of offenders and number of coconspirators (both U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons). The number of
offenders involved in a single terrorist incident ranged from 1 to 12 individuals.
When plots or attacks involved co-conspirators, there was an average of 2.7 U.S.
persons present. The mean for the number of non-U.S. persons involved was
much less (.57).

Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics for Key Independent Variables
Variable
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Number of offenders
3.82 (3.23)
Number of co2.77 (3.26)
conspirators
.57 (1.23)
Number of coconspirators non-U.S.
persons
Age
31.72 (11.48)
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals.

Range (min-max)
11 (1-12)
11 (0-11)
5 (0-5)
58 (17-75)

Demographic Characteristics
Table 3.3 reports offender demographics. Of the 194 offenders, 186 were
male and the average age was 31.7 years old. In addition, approximately 45.5%
of the sample offenders were in their 20s at time of their arrest (45.5%, n= 80).
Approximately 45.6% of the sample were U.S.-born offenders and an additional
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34.4% were naturalized. These demographic characteristics support the previous
findings of Kurzman et al., (2011).
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Table 3. 3
Description of Demographic Characteristics
Variable
Valid Percent (n)
% Missing
Male
95.9
0.0
Citizenship
(182)
6.2
U.S. Born
45.6
Naturalized
32.4
Legal Permanent Resident
15.4
Visa Holder
.5
Undocumented
6.0
Education
(94)
51.5
Less than High School
17.0
Completed High School
12.8
Technical School, non-college
2.1
Some college
45.7
Completed college
8.5
Some graduate school
3.2
Completed graduate school
4.3
Some Doctorate/Completed
6.4
Doctorate
Occupation
(131)
32.5
Professional
21.4
Semi-Skilled
32.8
Unskilled
45.8
Reported Marital Status
(189)
2.6
Married
39.2
Unmarried/Single/Divorced
60.8
Reported Did Have Children
34.0 (188)
3.1
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals. In all dichotomous variables,
only the yes values are reported.

The ethnic affiliation of the sample was diverse: Pakistani (13.3%, n = 22),
African American (12.1%, n = 20), and Caucasian (9.7%, n= 16). The education
level among the sample varied widely from high school dropouts to doctorates.
The occupation status among the sample also varied from unskilled laborers to
professional sector careers. This variation in education and occupation echoes
previous findings. For example, in his study, Kurzman (2013) did not find a
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common level of education and occupation among the individuals. In regards to
occupational status, they ranged from working class individuals to unemployed
individuals.
Social Characteristics
Table 3.4 indicates the description of the social characteristics that were
collected. Only two religious affiliations appeared for the offenders in the data
set. Those were Muslim (64.3 %) and Jewish (0.8%). The majority of the
offenders did not have prior military experience or training. Less than 10 percent
of the sample was reported to be suffering from a mental illness. Reported
radicalization resulted in a significant variable in which almost all offenders had
been radicalized through one or more avenues of radicalization.
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Table 3.4
Description of Reported Social Characteristics
Variable
Valid Percent (n)
% Missing
Religious Affiliation
(126)
35.1
Muslim
64.3
Jewish
0.8
n/a
34.9
Former Military Experience/training
7.7 (194)
0.0
No. of Diagnosed Mental Illnesses
(193)
0.5
None
91.2
1
6.7
2
1.6
3
0.5
Radicalization via:
Internet
30.6 (193)
0.5
Social Networking
15.0 (193)
0.5
Extremist Propaganda
26.4 (193)
0.5
Email/ Direct Communication
13.0 (193)
0.5
Overseas Terrorist Training
15.0 (193)
0.5
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals. In all dichotomous variables, only the yes
values are being reported in the table above.

Strain Variables
Offenders in general, experienced few reported negative experiences or life
events involving strain. It must be noted, as discussed as a limitation, that this
variable was difficult to record since it was uncommon for news reports and court
documents to discuss the offender’s life experiences of strain. Table 3.5 indicates
that were more occurrences of a presence of negative stimuli than the other two
types of strain.
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Table 3.5
Description of Strain Variables
Variable
Valid Percent (n)
Failure to achieve positive valued goals
(193)
No occurrences
97.9
1 event
1.6
2 events
.5
Loss of positive valued stimuli
(193)
No occurrences
99.5
Presence of negative stimuli
(192)
No occurrences
80.7
1 event
12.0
2 events
5.7
3 events
1.0
5 events
.5
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals.

% Missing
0.5

0.5
1.0

Behavioral Characteristics
Table 3.6 provides a description of the behavioral characteristics collected
in this study. The terrorists being examined were mostly first time offenders, with
no prior convictions. There were more offenders that committed their terrorist
attacks or plotted with other individuals rather than acting alone. Interestingly,
many offenders traveled overseas (44.0 %) in furtherance of their crime. It was
found that offenders used either one type of instrumentality (handgun, personnel
to fight jihad, etc.) or a combination of these mechanisms in their terrorist
operations. Often, money was collected and individuals were recruited to support
terrorist organizations. Lastly, a majority of offenders were, in fact, converts to
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Islam (63.5 %). This provides partial support to Thachuk et al.’s (2008) third
category of terrorists, which are third generation converts to Islam.

Table 3.6
Description of Behavioral Characteristics
Variable
Valid Percent (n)
% Missing
Reported Prior Criminal
13.3 (188)
3.1
History
Offender Type
(193)
0.0
Alone
35.2
Group
64.8
Role of Offender
(147)
24.2
Leader
8.8
Non-leader
46.9
n/a
42.9
Imam
3.1 (194)
0.0
International Travel
44.0 (193)
.5
Instrumentality
(190)
2.1
Weapons
10.0
General Supplies
5.8
Explosives
19.5
Safe houses and Support
5.8
Monetary Funding
14.2
Self as personnel for jihad
27.4
Multiple
17.4
Convert to Islam/Muslim
63.5 (126)
35.1
Prior Religion (Before
(194)
converting to Islam)
n/a
82.3
Catholic
10.4
Christian
2.1
Episcopalian
2.1
Muslim
1.0
Christian/Catholic
1.0
Buddhism
1.0
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals. In all dichotomous variables, only the yes
values are being reported in the table above.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS

This chapter reports the findings of the study. The discussion begins with
a description of the significant bivariate correlations. The chapter also presents
the key findings of the two-step cluster analyses evaluated against three
variables: terrorist affiliation, type of offense, and event type. Four separate
groups of offenders were identified through each cluster analysis; this was
reducible to three characteristically unique sets of offenders based on the
evaluation variables—Cyber Attackers, Convert Affiliates, and Trained Allies.
Finally, the chapter considers whether these results offer support or refute the
study hypotheses.

Results of Bivariate Correlations
First, before conducting the cluster analysis, bivariate coefficient
correlations were examined among all of the variables (33), excluding immigrant
generation since this information was missing for too many of the offenders of the
study. Bivariate correlations were examined for three case details with each of
the other three variable categories—demographic, social (including strain), and
behavioral characteristics—separately.
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Case Details and Demographic Characteristics
Table 4.1 provides the Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients among
three case detail variables and six personal demographic variables. Four notable
correlations were found. First, there was an inverse correlation between reported
marital status and type of offense variables (rs (189) = -.151, p < .05). This
significant finding suggests that married offenders were less likely to be involved
in a successful terrorist attack, therefore more likely to be involved in plots or
providing material support to terrorist organizations. Second, there was a positive
significant correlation between occupation and type of offense variables (rs (131)
= .193, p < .05). This suggests that offenders employed or associated with an
unskilled occupation level were more likely to be involved in a more successful
attack.
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Table 4.1
Nonparametric Inter-item Correlation Coefficients for Demographic
Characteristics
Measure

1

2

1. Type of
Offense

1.000

2. Number of CoConspirators

-.023

3. Offender Type

-.065

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.000
.775**

1.000

4. Citizenship

.060

-.027

.004

1.000

5. Gender

.102

.066

.010

.038

1.000

6. Reported
children

-.076

-.030

-.017

-.061

-.061

7. Education

-.188

-.098

-.203

.030

8. Reported
Marital Status

-.151*

.063

-.005

-.020

-.047

9. Occupation

.193*

-.052

.025

-.021

-.089

1.000
-.084
.615**
-.203*

1.000
.019

1.000

-.499** -.225*

1.000

Note. *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The third substantive finding was an inverse correlation between
occupation and having children (rs (128) = -.203, p < .05). Those who were
reported to have children tended to have a lower professional status associated
with an unskilled occupation. The fourth substantive pattern was a positive
significant correlation between occupation and education variables (rs (70) = -
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.499, p < .01). Offenders with a lower professional status associated with an
unskilled occupation.
It is also worth mentioning that the positive correlation between offender
type and number of co-conspirators involved was of sufficient strength to suggest
that only one of these variables needed to be included in the cluster analysis (rs
(192) = .775, p < .01). It is likely that the two variables are actually capturing the
same information. Those offenders that acted in a group were likely to have a
larger number of co-conspirators involved in the terrorist plot or attack.
Case Details and Social Characteristics
Table 4.2 provides the Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients among
three case detail variables and seven social characteristics variables. Many
notable correlations were found. First, there was a positive significant correlation
between reported mental illness and type of offense variables (rs (193) = .204, p
< .01). This suggests that offenders that were reported to be suffering or
diagnosed with some kind of mental illness were more likely to be involved in a
more successful terrorist attack. Second, there was an inverse correlation
between reported mental illness and number of co-conspirators variables (rs
(191) = -.144, p < .05). This significant finding suggests that offenders that were
reported to be suffering or diagnosed with some kind of mental illness were more
likely to have fewer co-conspirators involved in their plot or attack.
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Table 4.2
Nonparametric Inter-item Correlation Coefficients for Social Characteristics
Measure

1

2

3

1. Type of Offense

1.000

2. Number of CoConspirators

-.023

1.000

3. Offender Type

-.065

.775

4. Reported
Military History

.025

.016

5. Reported
Mental Illness

.204

6. Radicalization
via the Internet

.019

7. Radicalization
via social
networking

**

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.000

-.069

-.069

1.000

-.016

.110

1.000

-.066

.014

.059

.039

1.000

.048

-.027

.004

.040

.079

.602

**

1.000

8. Radicalization
via extremist
propaganda

.042

.020

.020

.045

.031

.648

**

.570

9. Radicalization
via direct
communication

-.019

.021

.024

-.054

-.062

-.089

-.119

-.056

1.000

10.Radicalization
via overseas
terrorist training

-.108

.265

*

.040

-.127

-.122

-.136

-.088

.356

**

-.144

*

**

.156

**

10

1.000

**

1.000

Note. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is
significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Attending overseas jihadist training camps was also correlated with a
couple of case details. The third substantive finding was a positive significant
correlation between radicalization via overseas training and number of coconspirators variables (rs (191) = .265, p < .01). Offenders that were radicalized
overseas in terrorist training camps were more likely to have acted with more coconspirators in their terrorist offense. A fourth substantive pattern was a positive
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significant correlation between radicalization via overseas training and offender
type variables (rs (192) = .156, p < .05). Offenders that were radicalized overseas
in terrorist training camps were more likely to have acted in a group versus alone.
Finally, several important correlations emerged regarding Internet
radicalization channels. There was a positive significant correlation between
radicalization via social networking and radicalization via the Internet variables (rs
(193) = .602, p < .01). Offenders who were radicalized through social networking
sites also used the Internet as a means of radicalization. Also, a positive
significant correlation exists between radicalization via extremist propaganda and
radicalization via the Internet variables (rs (193) = .648, p < .01). Offenders who
were radicalized through extremist propaganda material were also likely to be
radicalized through the use of the Internet.
Radicalization via extremist propaganda and radicalization via social
networking variables were also significantly related (rs (193) = .570, p < .01).
Offenders who were radicalized through extremist propaganda material were
also likely to be radicalized through the use of social networking sites. And,
offenders who reportedly were radicalized via overseas training were more likely
to have direct communication with terrorist officials (rs (193) = .356, p < .01).
Offenders who were radicalized through attending overseas terrorist affiliated
training camps were also likely to be radicalized through communication, either
direct or via email with terrorist officials.
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Case Details and Strain Variables
Table 4.3 provides the Spearman rho correlation coefficients among three case
detail variables and three strain variables. Two notable correlations were found.
First, there was a positive significant correlation between the presence of
negative stimuli and type of offense variables (rs (192) = .315, p < .01). Offenders
who experienced negative stimuli (strain) in his or her life were less likely to be
involved in a successful terrorist plot or attack. There was also a positive
significant correlation between the failure to achieve positive stimuli and
presence of negative stimuli variables (rs (192) = .234, p < .01). Offenders who
were unable to achieve positive stimuli, such as autonomy were also likely to
experience negative stimuli in his or her life, such as parents getting divorced or
the death of a family member.
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Table 4.3
Nonparametric Inter-item Correlation Coefficients for Strain Variables
Measure

1

2

3

4

1. Type of Offense

1.000

2. Number of Co-Conspirators

-.023

3. Offender Type

-.065

.775**

1.000

4. Failure to achieve positive stimuli

0.370

.028

.004

.046

.014

5

6

1.000

1.000

5. Loss of positive stimuli
6. Presence of negative stimuli

.315**

.234**

1.000

Note. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Case Details and Behavioral Characteristics
Table 4.4 provides the Spearman rho correlation coefficients among three
case detail variables and five behavioral characteristics variables. Seven notable
correlations were found. The first set of findings pertained to type of offense.
There was a positive significant correlation between the type of offense and
reported criminal history (rs (188) = .210, p < .01). Offenders involved in a more
successful terrorist offense were more likely to have a reported criminal history.
There was also an inverse correlation between type of offense and reported
international travel (rs (193) = -.193, p < .01). Offenders involved in a more
successful terrorist offense were less likely to have traveled internationally in
furtherance of their terrorist offense.
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Instrumentality, the range of resources and weapons used during the attacks,
were associated with two case details. There was an inverse correlation between
type of offense and instrumentality (rs (190) = -.466, p < .01). Offenders involved
in a more successful terrorist offense were more likely to use conventional
weapons during their terrorist operation than other mechanisms, such as funding,
jihad training, or a combination of these. A positive significant correlation was
observed between number of co-conspirators and instrumentality (rs (188) = .213,
p < .01). Terrorist offenses in which there were co-conspirators involved were
more likely to use a greater type of instrumentality, such as jihad training or
multiple instrumentalities in their offenses.

Table 4.4
Nonparametric Inter-item Correlation Coefficients for Behavioral Characteristics
Measure

1

1. Type of Offense

1.000

2. Number of CoConspirators

-.023

3. Offender Type

-.065

4. Reported Imam
5. Reported Criminal
History

-.016

6. Reported Convert
to Islam/Muslim

.210**
.084

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1.000
.775**

1.000

-.054

-.055

1.000

.044

.003

-.065

-.108

-.080

-.092

1.000
.375**

1.000

7. Instrumentality

-.466**

.213**

.116

.010

-.102

-.112

8. Reported
International Travel

-.193**

.184*

.060

-.039

-.066

-.096

1.000
.298**

1.000

Note. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is
significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Two other correlations warrant attention. A positive significant correlation
was observed between number of co-conspirators and reported international
travel (rs (191) = .184, p < .05). Terrorist offenses in which there were coconspirators involved were more likely to have traveled internationally in
furtherance of their crime. Another substantive pattern was a positive significant
correlation between reported criminal history and reported convert to Islam (rs
(125) = .375, p < .01). Offenders with a reported criminal history were also likely
to be converts to Islam. Lastly, there was a positive significant correlation
between reported international travel and instrumentality (rs (189) = .298, p <
.01). Offenders who traveled overseas in furtherance of their crime used more
advanced instrumentalities or multiple instrumentalities for their planned plot or
attack.

Results of Cluster Analysis
Model 1: Clustering by Terrorist Affiliation
The cluster analysis revealed four clusters of offenders who had similar
case details, demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics assessed
against the evaluation variable, terrorist affiliation: 1) Internet Radicals (heavily
radicalized group of offenders with no terrorist organization affiliation), 2) Deviant
Associates (Al Qaeda affiliated non-radicalized, group offenders), 3) Trained
Jihadists (Al Qaeda group offenders who traveled abroad), and 4) Mobile Lone
Wolves (Al Qaeda, heavily radicalized group offenders). The cluster summary
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indicated nine important variables, which generated these clusters. Those
variables were terrorist affiliation, offender type (alone and group) reported
international travel, radicalization via the Internet, radicalization via extremist
propaganda, radicalization via social networking sites, radicalization via email or
direct communication with terrorist officials, and radicalization via overseas
training with terrorist organizations. Table 4.5 provides results. To develop a
more comprehensive description of each cluster, notable demographic
characteristics are described where distinct patterns appear.
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Table 4.5
Two-Step Cluster Illustrating Radicalization Channels Evaluated by Terrorist
Affiliation

Terrorist Affiliation
Offender Type
Alone
Group

Cluster 1:
Internet
Radicals

Cluster 2:
Deviant
Associates

Cluster 3:
Trained
Jihadists

None
(41.2%)

Al Qaeda
(51.0%)

Al Qaeda
(50.0%)

Cluster 4:
Mobile
Lone
Wolves
Al Qaeda
(43.2%)

10.4 % (7)

65.7 % (44)

23.9 % (16)
28.5 % (35)

0.0 %
39.8 % (49)

31.7 % (39)

0.0 %

Radicalization Factors
International travel

22.9 % (19)

None

29.9 % (32)

Foreign training

3.6 % (1)

None

30.9 % (50)

Extremist propaganda

86.0 % (43)

None

Internet materials
None

5.7 % (8)

83.1 % (49)
1.5 % (2)

Social networking sites

96.6 % (28)

None

0.0 %
45.8 % (49)

0.0 %
30.2 % (49)

0.0 %
35.0 % (49)

0.0 %
37.4 % (49)

0.0 %

55.4 % (46)
0.0 %

96.4 % (27)

21.7 % (18)
24.3 % (26)

0.0

11.7 % (19)

27.2 % (44)

12.0 % (6)

2.0 % (1)

28.6 % (40)

30.7 % (43)

6.8 % (4)

10.2 % (6)

32.1 % (42)

29.0 % (38)

0.0 %

14.3 % (23)

30.4 % (49)

28.6% (46)

Direct communication

16.0 % (4)

24.0 % (6)

60.0 % (15)

None

28.5 % (47)

26.1 % (43)

18.8 % (31)

3.4 % (1)
26.7% (43)

0.0 %
26.7 % (44)

Note. The bolded figures represent important results. N is reported in
parentheses.
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Cluster 1 represents a group of Internet radicalized defendants as apt to
work in a group or alone without any affiliation to terrorist organizations. These
individuals had no discernable, direct links to recognized terrorist organizations.
However, they were radicalized through extremist material and social networking
mechanisms available through the Internet. Extremist propaganda, online
resources, and social networking sites may materially contribute in two manners
to their criminal behavior: these materials foster their radicalization, and through
accessing these sources, individuals may find co-conspirators to carry out their
attacks. On average these defendants committed their offense in a group of 3.1
offenders, with an average of 2.2 U.S.-based co-conspirators. This suggests that
in reaching out to others, individuals often encounter foreign-based operatives.
Although this group of defendants had no direct links to terrorist
organizations, the majority (68.6%) provided material support to a terrorist
organization. This can be due to the fact that the majority were U.S. born citizens
that did not travel overseas. There were three prominent ethnicities that stood out
in the cluster, Pakistani (17.0%), Jordanian (10.0%), and Caucasian (10.0%).
Interestingly; these defendants were mostly Muslim (69.8%), single (66.0%), and
had some college education (65.5%). Lastly, the defendants grouped into Cluster
1 ranged in age from 17 to 45 although there were more offenders in their 20s at
their time of arrest and held unskilled occupations.
Cluster 2 represents a group of non-radicalized Al Qaeda affiliated
defendants as apt to work in a group as alone. Even though these offenders had
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direct links with Al Qaeda, there was an absence of radicalization, contrary to
Cluster 1. This suggests that this group of defendants was influenced through
other means. On average, these defendants committed their offense in a group
of 4.7 offenders, with an average of 3.4 U.S.-based co-conspirators.
Cluster 2 defendants were involved in material support to terrorist
organizations (57.1%) and plots to attack the United States (42.9%). This cluster
consisted of African American (12.5%) converts to Islam (64.0%), who were
single (73.3%) and had some college education (42.9%). This cluster had the
most females (5 out of the 8 of the entire data sample) of all the clusters.
Additionally, the cluster was represented by 49.0% U.S. born citizens, many of
whom held unskilled occupations (43.8%).
Cluster 3 represents a group of radicalized and Al Qaeda affiliated
defendants who were as apt to work in a group as alone and traveled abroad in
furtherance of their crime. Similar to Cluster 2, these offenders had direct links to
Al Qaeda officials and members. This group of defendants was radicalized
through terrorist training camps and direct communication with terrorist officials
by means of international travel. On average, these defendants committed their
offense in a group of 6.1 offenders, with an average of 5.1 U.S.-based coconspirators. This suggests that despite overseas travel for operational support
and training, defendants maintained their relationships with U.S.-based
individuals in order to carry out their terrorist offenses.
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In general, the individuals in this cluster were younger than observed in
other clusters (e.g., 14.0% were 25 years old at the time of the crime). A large
portion of the defendants were of Yemeni (16.3%) or Pakistani (11.6%) descent.
Cluster 3 included many offenders who were U.S. born citizens (44.2%).
Contrary to the previous two clusters, there was a variety in the type of
instrumentality these defendants used and planned to use, explosives (17.8%),
jihad training (44.4%), and a combination of various weapons and devices
(24.4%). The majority of the offenders were born into a Muslim family (80.6%)
and most were married with children (83.9%).
Cluster 4 represents a group of heavily radicalized defendants who
primarily acted alone in their terrorist offenses. These individuals had direct links
to Al Qaeda, although little information was available regarding how they were
recruited into jihad: prior direct contact with Al Qaeda operatives and Internetbased indoctrination were absent. However, these offenders managed to travel
overseas for operational support from Al Qaeda members and officials. This
cluster had the most highly educated defendants with 21.1% with some college
and another 21.1% with or in pursuit of a Ph.D. degree. However, there were
more unmarried than married offenders. Like the other clusters in this analysis,
there was a predominance of Pakistani (14.6%) and Caucasian (14.6%)
offenders versus other ethnic affiliations.
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Model 2: Clustering by Type of Offense
This cluster analysis tested whether defendants could be grouped by
offense type, meaning that unique characteristics may be visible among those
choosing to provide material support to terrorist activity compared with individuals
who engage in or attempt a direct attack against a U.S. target. The cluster
analysis indicated four types of offender types according to the evaluation
variable, type of offense: 1) Semi-Skilled Radicals (unmarried radicalized
offenders), 2) Deviant Converts (unmarried, non-radicalized offenders), 3)
Professional Trainees (married offenders with children who received terrorist
training), and 4) Web-Based Radicals (married offenders, radicalized through
electronic media).
Clusters were defined by eight variables: type of offense, reported marital
status, reported children, reported international travel, radicalization via the
Internet, radicalization via extremist propaganda, radicalization via social
networking sites, and radicalization via overseas training with terrorist
organizations. However, it should be noted that the evaluation variable, type of
offense, was not correlated with cluster composition. In other words, all clusters
indicated group of defendants involved in only material support to terrorist
organizations. Unique clusters were not found for groups of defendants involved
in plots, attempted attacks, and successful terrorist attacks. Table 4.6 provides
results.
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Table 4.6
Two-Step Cluster Illustrating Radicalization Channels Evaluated by Type of
Offense
Cluster 1:
SemiSkilled
Radicals

Cluster 2:
Deviant
Converts

Cluster 3:
Professional
Trainees

Cluster 4:
Web-Based
Radicals

66.7 %

45.8 %

70.7 %

75.0 %

Married
Unmarried

22.1 % (15)
30.3 % (33)

0.0 %
44.0 % (48)

60.3 % (41)
0.0 %

17.6 % (12)
25.7 % (28)

Children
No children

19.4 % (12)
31.3 % (36)

12.9 % (8)
34.8 % (40)

64.5 % (40)
0.9 % (1)

3.2 % (2)
33.0 % (38)

Radicalization Factors
International travel
None

21.0 % (17)
32.3 % (31)

3.7 % (3)
46.9 % (45)

25.9 % (21)
20.8 % (20)

49.4 % (40)
0.0 %

Foreign training
None

3.6 % (1)
31.5 % (47)

0.0 %
32.2 % (48)

35.7 % (10)
20.8 % (31)

60.7 % (17)
15.4 % (23)

Extremist propaganda
None

85.7 % (42)
4.7 % (6)

0.0 %
37.5 % (48)

2.0 % (1)
31.3 % (40)

12.2 % (6)
26.6 % (34)

Internet materials
None

82.1 % (46)
1.7 % (2)

0.0 %
39.7 % (48)

3.6 % (2)
32.2 % (39)

14.3 % (8)
26.4 % (32)

Social networking sites
None

96.2 % (25)
15.2 % (23)

3.8 % (1)
31.1 % (47)

0.0 %
27.2 % (41)

0.0 %
26.5 % (40)

Type of Offense
Material Support to
Terrorism
Marital/Children

Note. The bolded figures represent important results. N is reported in
parentheses.

Cluster 1 represents a group of unmarried radicalized offenders. These
individuals were radicalized through propaganda materials and social networking
mechanisms available through the Internet. These same offenders traveled
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overseas in furtherance of their crime. This group included terrorist incidents with
an average of 3.0 participants and with an average of 2.0 U.S.-based coconspirators.
This group of offenders with a non-Al Qaeda terrorist affiliation was mostly
Pakistani (16.2%), Jordanian (10.8%), and Caucasian (10.8). Most were Muslim
(68.3%) and U.S. born citizens (53.2%). This cluster was represented by semiskilled offenders with some college education (63.0%).
Cluster 2 represents a group of unmarried, non-radicalized defendants.
These defendants were not radicalized through any of the radicalization means
collected. Nor did these defendants travel overseas; rather they were influenced
within the United States. This group of offenders was almost equally both
material supporters to terrorist organizations and plotters of terrorist attacks (45.8
% and 43.8%, respectively).
This group included terrorist incidents with an average of 3.4 offenders
and with an average of 2.1 U.S.-based co-conspirators. Additionally, these
supporters and plotters had no terrorist affiliation and many were U.S. born
citizens (50.0%) A large portion were African American (30.0%) and most were
either Muslim (44.0%) or converts (53.8%). Cluster 2 had 38.0% offenders with
some college education and an unskilled occupational status.
Cluster 3 represents a group of married defendants with children. Many of
these defendants received overseas terrorist training. The overseas terrorist
training was the major influencing factor for this group of defendants. This group
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included terrorist incidents with an average of 3.8 offenders, with an average of
2.8 U.S.-based co-conspirators, and .3 non-U.S.-based co-conspirators. Cluster
3 represented offenders with a non-Al Qaeda affiliation, who were mostly U.S.
born citizens (45.9%), Caucasian (15.4%) and Pakistani (17.9%), and of Muslim
affiliation (63.0%). Lastly, a large portion of these offenders held professional
careers (41.2%) and had a college education (42.9%).
Cluster 4 represents non-radicalized married defendants. Rather than
being radicalized through modern telecommunication channels, these defendants
traveled overseas to attain support for their terrorist activity. This group included
terrorist incidents in which the number of offenders involved on average was 4.7
offenders, with an average of 3.6 U.S.-based co-conspirators, and .5 non-U.S.based co-conspirators. Offenders in this group were either Al Qaeda (52.5%) or
non-Al Qaeda (47.5%) affiliated terrorists. Offenders were also primarily split
between U.S. born (41.7%) and naturalized citizens (41.7%); although, most
were Muslim affiliated (70.8%). A portion of those offenders were of Pakistani
(13.2%) descent.
Model 3: Revised Offense Type
A final cluster analysis was performed to deal with a problem revealed in
the second cluster analysis: the evaluation variable, type of offense was
ineffective due to skewed frequency distribution. The problem was that there
were too few cases of plotting, attempts, and completed attacks for the modeling
process to uncover stable results. In the new variable, events involving a plot,
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attempted, or successful attack were consolidated to compare against incidents
where individuals only provided material support to terrorist organizations. Thus,
the revised evaluation variable was coded: 1 = material support to terrorism and
0 = other.
This analysis revealed four clusters of terrorist offenders who had similar
case details, demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics. Using event
type as a confirmatory variable revealed four clusters: 1) Unmarried Attack
Oriented Offenders, 2) Married Supporters, 3) Unmarried Plotters and Attackers,
and 4) Unmarried Non-Radical Plotters and Attackers. The cluster summary
indicated eight important variables: event type, reported marital status, reported
children, reported international travel, radicalization via the Internet, radicalization
via extremist propaganda, radicalization via social networking sites, and
radicalization via overseas training with terrorist organizations. Table 4.7
provides results.
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Table 4.7
Two-Step Cluster Illustrating Radicalization Channels Evaluated by Event Type
Cluster 2
Married
Supporters

Cluster 3
Unmarried
Plotters and
Attackers

Material
Support, 54.2%

Other, 70.0%

22.1 % (15)
30.3 % (33)

60.3 % (41)
0.0 %

17.6 % (12)
25.7 % (28)

0.0 % (12)
44.0 % (48)

Reported Child

19.4 % (12)

64.5 % (40)

3.2 % (2)

12.9 % (8)

No children

31.3 % (36)

0.9 % (1)

33.0 % (38)

34.8 % (40)

Radicalization Factors
International Travel
None

21.0 % (17)
32.3 % (31)

25.9 % (21)
20.8 % (20)

49.4 % (40)
0.0 %

3.7 % (3)
46.9 % (45)

Foreign training
None

3.6 % (1)
31.5 % (47)

35.7 % (10)
20.8 % (31)

60.7 % (17)
15.4 % (23)

0.0 %
32.2 % (48)

Extremist propaganda
None

85.7 % (42)
4.7 % (6)

2.0 % (1)
31.3 % (40)

12.2 % (6)
26.6 % (34)

0.0 %
37.5 % (48)

Internet
None

82.1 % (46)
1.7 % (2)

3.6 % (2)
32.2 % (39)

14.3 % (8)
26.4 % (32)

0.0 %
39.7 % (48)

Social networking sites
None

96.2 % (25)
15.2 % (23)

0.0 %
27.2 % (41)

0.0 %
26.5 % (40)

3.8 %
31.1 % (47)

Event Type
Marital/ Children
Married
Unmarried

Cluster 1
Unmarried
Attack
Oriented
Offenders
Other, 66.7%

Cluster 4
Unmarried
Non-Radical
Plotters and
Attackers
Other, 75.0%

Note. The bolded figures represent important results. N is reported in
parentheses.
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Cluster 1 represents a group of unmarried defendants who plotted,
attacked, or attempted to attack (66.7%) against the United States. These
defendants were radicalized through materials and social networking
mechanisms available through the Internet. Due to the absence of international
travel and not having any direct communication with terrorist officials, offenders
in this cluster had a non-Al Qaeda terrorist group affiliation. These terrorist
incidents involved on average of 3.0 offenders, with an average of 2.0 U.S.based co-conspirators.
This group of offenders was characterized by U.S. born citizenship
(53.2%); Pakistani (16.2%), Caucasian (10.8%), and Jordanian (10.8%) ethnic
affiliation, Muslim affiliation (68.3%), some college education (63.0%), and
unskilled occupation (48.4%).
Cluster 2 represents married offenders who provided some kind of
material support to terrorist organizations. These offenders were not radicalized
by any of ethnic/Internet-based means examined; however, they traveled
overseas in support of their terrorist activity. These terrorist incidents involved an
average of 3.8 offenders, with an average of 2.8 U.S.-based co-conspirators. In
addition, this cluster indicated that these offenders were U.S. born citizens
(45.9%), held some college education (42.9%), and held a professional career
(41.2%). Many of these offenders were not Al Qaeda affiliated (51.2%). Most of
the defendants in this cluster were Muslim (63.0%). The prominent ethnicity was
Pakistani (17.9%).
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Cluster 3 represents unmarried travelers who mostly plotted, attempted to
attacks, and attacked against the United States. These defendants were not
radicalized through any of the radicalization means examined; instead they
traveled overseas to seek support and guidance for their terrorist activity. These
terrorist incidents involved an average of 4.7 offenders, with an average of 3.6
U.S.-based co-conspirators. Cluster 3 individuals were both affiliated with Al
Qaeda (52.5%) and non-Al Qaeda (47.5%) terrorist organizations. Interestingly,
this cluster included the same number of U.S born and naturalized citizens
(41.7% for each type). The offenders included in this group held some college
education (40.7%) and had an unskilled occupation (65.4%).
Cluster 4 represents unmarried offenders who mostly plotted against the
United States or were involved in an attempted or unsuccessful attack against
the United States. Similar to Cluster 3, these defendants were not radicalized
and did not travel overseas for terrorist activity support. Instead, these
defendants sought support and guidance domestically. This group included
terrorist incidents in which the number of offenders involved on average was 3.4
offenders, with an average of 2.1 U.S.-based co-conspirators. The terrorist
affiliation for this group of offenders varied across Al Qaeda, non-Al Qaeda, and
none; none of them were overrepresented in the group. Again, many of the
offenders in this cluster were U.S. born citizens (50.0%). The largest ethnic group
was African American (30.0%), and many defendants in this cluster were
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converts to Islam (53.8%). This group of offenders’ educational level ranged from
some high school to completion of advanced degrees, such as a M.A. or Ph.D.
Model 1 and Model 3 Cluster Assignment Comparisons
A cross-tabulation (cross-tabs) analysis was performed for the cluster
assignments that resulted from Model 3 and those of Model 1. Interestingly, it
was found that those terrorist offenders of Cluster 1 are the same offenders for
Model 1 and 3.These 46 offenders represent 26% of the total sample, creating a
distinct group of offenders.
Unmarried and with some college education, this group of individuals are
heavily influenced by radicalization materials available through the Internet social
networking sites. While less apt to carry out successful attacks, their willingness
to provide material support or to attempt attacks without having direct affiliations
with terrorist groups makes them particularly dangerous. Their electronic footprint
is the only way to identify and track these individuals.
Although not as distinguishable as the group of offenders described
above, a second group of offenders was found, which were the unmarried nonradical mix of plotters and supporters of Model 3 and the deviant associates of
Model 1. These plotters and supporters of terrorism represented 18% of the total
sample. This group of offenders were U.S. citizens, unmarried, mostly converts
to Islam, and had a high level of education. Lastly, the trained jihadists and
mobile lone wolves were dispersed among all cluster of Model 3. Nonetheless,
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the clusters shared offense and offender characteristics, including overseas
travel, terrorist training, and terrorist affiliation. Table 4.8 provides results.
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Table 4.8
Comparison of Model 1 and Model 3 Cluster Assignments
Model 3: Event Type
Model 1:
Terrorist
Affiliation

Cluster 1:
Internet
Radicals

Cluster 1:
Unmarried
Attack
Oriented
Offenders
46 people
(26% of
sample)

Cluster 2:
Deviant
Associates

0 (0%)

Cluster 3:
Trained
Jihadists

Cluster 3:
Unmarried
Plotters and
Attackers

Cluster 4:
Unmarried NonRadical Plotters
and Attackers

0 (0%)

2 people
(1% of sample)

0 (0%)

Unique
Characteristics
• Involved in
plots
• Unmarried
• No children
• Int. travel
• Foreign
training

Unique
Characteristics
• Unmarried
• U.S. citizens
• Some
college
education

0 (0%)

Row Total

Cluster 2:
Married
Supporters

10 people
(6% of sample)

0 (0%)

Unique
Characteristics
• Married with
children
• Int. travel
• Foreign
training
• Muslim
affiliated
17 people
(10% of sample)

25 people
(14% of sample)

Unique
Characteristics
• Married with
children
• Direct
communication
w/ terrorist
leaders
• Muslim
affiliated

Unique
Characteristics
• Plots
• Both U.S. born
and
naturalized
citizens
• Some college
• Unskilled
occupation
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31 people
(18% of sample)
Unique
Characteristics
• Involved in
plots
• Converts
• Unmarried
• Highly
educated
• U.S. citizens
2 people
(1% of sample)
Unique
Characteristics
• Plots
• U.S. citizens
• Converts to
Islam
• Highly
educated
• Unmarried

48 people
Joint
characteristics
• No terrorist
affiliation
• Radicalization
via
propaganda,
internet,
social
networking
sites
• Material
supporters
41 people
Joint
characteristics
• Material
supporters
• No electronic
radicalization
• Al Qaeda
affiliated

44 people
Joint
characteristics
• Material
Supporters
• Al Qaeda
affiliated
• Traveled
overseas
• Foreign
training

2 people
(1% of sample)

Cluster 4:
Mobile
Lone
Wolves

Unique
Characteristics
• Unmarried

14 people
(8% of sample)
Unique
Characteristics
• Material
Supporters
• Professional
career
• Muslim
affiliated

13 people
(7% of sample)
Unique
Characteristics
• Plots and
Material
Support
• Unmarried
• U.S. born &
naturalized
citizens
• Some college
• Unskilled
occupation
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15 people
(9% of sample)

44 people

Unique
Characteristics
• Plots and
Support
• Sought
support
domestically
• U.S. born
• Converts to
Islam
• Unmarried

Joint
characteristics
• No electronic
radicalization
• Al Qaeda
affiliated
• Highly
educated

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

Overall, this study found some evidence to suggest that homegrown
terrorists can be parsed into clusters. Moreover, significant relationships were
found among the case details and offender characteristics. This suggests that
there are identifiable social and behavioral patterns among terrorist offenders
that may be the focus of crime prevention efforts. Homegrown terrorists can be
differentiated, albeit to a limited extent, by radicalization channels and terrorist
affiliation, as well as type of offense. This chapter presents policy implications
associated with the clusters of offenders found. They study revealed a typology
of three groups of offenders ranging from Cyber Attackers to Convert Affiliates,
and Trained Allies.

Bivariate Correlations Significant Findings
Demographic Characteristics
Contrary to what would be expected, the offenders who held a lower
unskilled occupation were more likely to be involved in a more successful
terrorist operation. While that may be surprising at first, terrorist attacks are now
being plotted and acted upon using conventional tools and supplies at the
disposable of virtually anyone. Therefore, expertise is not needed in the
manufacture or assembly of special weapons to carry out an act of terrorism. It
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was also found that offenders suffering or diagnosed with a mental illness were
more likely to be involved in a plot or attack.
One of the implications associated with these findings is that mental health
service providers should be trained to identify potential terrorist threats. A great
deal of effort has gone into training law enforcement, but mental health providers
may be in a good position to detect these individuals and prevent future criminal
behavior. In addition, these offenders were also found to attack alone or with
fewer co-conspirators than the other non-mentally unstable offenders.
Community outreach is needed between mental health services, criminal
justice, and community services, particularly those faith-based programs housed
within religious institutions. These civilian service providers are better positioned
to identify vulnerable individuals or convicted offenders (prison-based programs)
who are at risk for extremist radicalization and are likely to pose a threat to
themselves and others. In the case of correctional settings, an extremist risk
assessment tool could be added to intake and screening procedures so that
vulnerable individuals are not housed with known activists. While this is already
in place in some institutions, existing assessment tools/protocol could be
modified to focus on religious affiliation and influence among inmates, particularly
born again converts to Islam.
Mosques and other religious organizations can be involved in crime
prevention efforts. Specifically, leaders of worship settings can be trained to
identify individuals at risk or those who have a violent interpretation of the religion
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and therefore pose a threat against the United States. Also, therapy,
psychological evaluation, and treatment can be provided in order to prevent
future extremism. There is also the Justice and Mental Health Collaboration
Program (JMHCP), which identifies those incarcerated and mentally unstable
offenders and provide mental health treatment and substance abuse programs
(Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Program, n.d.). This program is thought
to increase the safety of the public by providing mentally ill offenders with the
appropriate care they need. The JMHCP also helps in finding alternative
prosecution methods for those mentally unstable where they can rehabilitate
through treatment efforts rather than be given a punitive sentence for their
offense (Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Program, n.d.). It may be
possible to add an “extremist risk assessment” component to screening
instruments used during intake. These modified risk assessments can extend the
existing safety net by existing identifying individuals at-risk for radicalization.
Due to the possible occurrence of terrorism actions by mentally unstable
individuals, additional research is needed. This study was not designed to
examine mental health issues in detail. Future research is needed that is able to
better evaluate the association between mental health and radicalization among
homegrown terrorists. In addition, a future study would evaluate isolation issues
for each of the participants in order to explain why these offenders are more
likely to act upon with fewer co-conspirators than others.
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Radicalization Processes and Case Details
The study findings indicated that terrorist offenders traveled overseas to
terrorist training camps in furtherance of their crime. Specifically, offenders who
traveled overseas to training camps were more likely to have more coconspirators involved in their terrorist plot or attack. This indicates that generating
networks with terrorist leaders and other terrorist officials and non-officials has
not been replaced by the modern technology of the Internet and its various
sharing of jihadist sources and communication outlets; such as extremist blogs,
forums, and social media sites like YouTube. However, since there was no
significant relationship between radicalization via overseas training and
successful attack, it leads to indicate that the offender’s overseas travel is
operational support and not necessarily support to undertake the attack.
As discussed in the literature review, a single path to radicalization does
not exist nor have we found conclusive evidence of a set of radicalization factors
that indicate direct ties to terrorist activity. However, this study finds some
support of the importance of Internet-based resources. It was also discovered
that radicalization via the Internet, social media sites, extremist propaganda, and
contact with terrorist officials has not fully replaced the operational support that is
often attained by traveling overseas and attending training camps. All these
methods of influence essentially work together in influencing, recruiting, and
radicalizing individuals to commit acts of terrorism. Specifically, those that were
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radicalized by the use of the Internet often also used social networking sites and
extremist propaganda.
The availability of violent jihadist content and extremist propaganda is only
one of the quandaries that law enforcement is faced with in attempting to
intercept web-based violent jihadist content and the removal of online extremism.
Due to the First Amendment’s freedom of expression, terrorist individuals take
advantage of American hosting companies to create their jihadist websites,
forums, YouTube accounts, and other social media. There are many hosting
companies, like GoDaddy.com and Dynadot.com that allow their customers to
create a website, such as the RevolutionMuslim.com, without having to disclose
their true identities by providing “care of” company addresses (Klausen, Barbieri,
Reichlin-Melnick, & Zelin, 2012).
Another problem that law enforcement is faced with is that not all content
can be removed, just because it is jihadist related. The content has to meet the
imminent threat criteria (which is rarely the case) or violate the web hosts’ terms
of service (Klausen et al., 2012). Policy allowing law enforcement to interdict or
shut down jihadist content is needed in order to minimize the number of
individuals being radicalized online. An alternate solution would be some kind of
systematic web crawling or Internet bot, within the World Wide Web (the Web) to
capture who is accessing the extremist propaganda and the various blogs,
websites, forums, etc. that are linked together and essentially accessed
simultaneously. This web crawling system would identify specific targets, those
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that are the most influential or attract the most viewers and this would aid in their
removal from the Internet.
For example, there is the specially designed web crawling program that
was used in a recent study by Kila Joffres and Martin Bouchard (2014) in which
the researchers examined the effectiveness of different disruption strategies of
child pornography websites on the Internet. One of its findings indicated hub
attacks to be the most effective. Hub attacks are defined as targeting main
websites with many links to other sites. Hub attacks were found to be effective in
disrupting the network since this removes links between websites, therefore
reducing the amount of available material and making it harder to find (Joffres &
Bouchard, in press). Applied to the current study, this would mean targeting
extremist or terrorist related websites that have a large array of links to other
extremist or terrorist material on the Internet.
Systematically disabling critical websites could be an effective crime
prevention strategy. It would serve to increase the effort needed to access
extremist material, but also protects free speech since it is not invading
individuals’ access routes, but instead targeting the specific content of the Web in
its entirety. While the findings do not yield all the avenues used by terrorist
organizations like Al Qaeda, it can be stated that Al Qaeda attempts to radicalize
and recruit via the Internet, extremist propaganda, overseas training, and direct
communication is successful.
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In addition to interdiction efforts by law enforcement via the Internet, in
August 2011, the Obama Administration signed the National Strategy for
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States
(National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners) in order to combat terrorism in
the homeland through community based approach (Bjelopera, 2014). While the
National Strategy for Empowering Locals Partners has its strict goals and
responsibilities in mind, it does not dictate exactly how these efforts will be
administered. For example, the narrative discusses partnerships between law
enforcement agencies and community leaders in order to provide information on
the threat of homegrown extremism, but it does not give direction as to how
those partnerships will be established. In addition, those partnerships will serve
as the community’s eyes to detect and prevent radicalization to violence. Ideally,
this policy would meet with community leaders to provide information and training
on detecting, reporting, and ultimately preventing radicalization of individuals that
may lead to terrorist attacks against the United States.
Moreover, a prevention and intervention program like the National
Strategy for Empowering Local Partners can be promising. But for a program to
be effective, trust has to be built between law enforcement agencies and
community leaders. Additionally, community leaders have to be trained and
informed on the concept of radicalization and guidance to drive detection of such
threatening individuals. Without proper training and relationship building, the
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community will be reluctant or fearful of contacting law enforcement for help,
guidance, or offer information.
Future research is needed to examine the quantity of the available jihadist
content on the Internet and its access traffic by individuals, prior offenders and
non-offenders. The examination of this data will yield to more rigorous regulation
of the material viewed by individuals on the Internet and at what point that access
will be prohibited or blocked. As already mentioned above, web crawling can be
a useful tool for law enforcement and therefore another avenue of research for
scholars. Scholars would be able to view the quantitative success that web
crawling has on accessibility of extremist material by offenders.
Strain
The findings of the study supported Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory.
However, it should be noted that the researcher did not collect information on the
specific motivation to commit the terrorist plot or attack. The findings indicated
that those offenders who experienced negative stimuli (negative events or
situations) in his or her life were less likely to be involved in a successful terrorist
attack. Those offenders who experienced negative events or situations were also
likely to not be able to achieve their goals in life, such as financial stability,
respect, or autonomy. These results can also yield indication that those who are
not successful or happy in their life achievements are less of a risk than others;
such as radicalized individuals or mentally unstable individuals. While it can be
stated that there is an indication of experiencing negative events in the offender’s
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life and criminal behavior, it is uncertain whether the offender chose to commit a
crime out of revenge or prevention as theorized by Agnew (1992).
Behavioral Characteristics
It was found that those offenders involved in a more successful plot or
attack had a prior criminal record, in which they were prosecuted. Furthermore,
those that had a criminal history were likely to be converts to Islam. The data
collected indicated instances of offenders who converted to Islam by their own
will or through the influence of others. As discussed in the discussion of
radicalized individuals, greater links between non-radicalized mosques and
prisons are necessary in order to prevent the dissemination of unstable or violent
interpretations of Islam.
Due to the fact that offenders with a prior criminal history are likely to
engage in a successful plot or attack indicates more stringent probation terms
and agreements may be needed. Specifically, monitoring or prohibiting Internet
activity may be a condition of release. Furthermore, since those with a criminal
record are also likely to be converts to Islam, religious privileges in prison should
be regulated more closely. Currently, the First Amendment is a major protective
barrier for prison inmates and the specific material they can receive and mail out,
specifically extremist or propaganda material.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reports that prison officials are
allowed to withhold some material, on a case-by-case basis, mainly determined
by prison safety. If a magazine article or set of articles is a threat to the safety of
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the prison environment, the facility is allowed to remove only that unsafe material
(American Civil Liberties Union, 2010). However, when it comes to outgoing mail,
inmates can reach out to extremist groups freely without disruption from prison
officials. Again, prison officials can only intervene, if that outgoing
correspondence discusses escape plans, threats, running an illegal business,
and blackmail. However, this list can be extended to include extremist
radicalization, specifically violent jihadist ideology.
In addition, the activity within mosques may also need more vigilant
surveillance. Since offenders who had a criminal record were also converts to
Islam, religious leaders with access to convicted individuals require careful
examination. Regular, intensive screenings and background checks should be
conducted on all religious leaders and Imams authorized to regularly visit
inmates in prison. Prison officials can create a trusted list of allowed religious
leaders instead of allowing anyone into prison visitation sessions.
Future research should examine the various types of offenses by
homegrown offenders in order to identify any significant patterns in prior
convictions that may act as a precursor or transitioning behavior prior to
committing or planning to commit an act of terrorism. This type of identification
would again be useful among community leaders, religious leaders, and law
enforcement. Community leaders and mosque leaders serve as the primary eyes
of law enforcement in providing investigative leads and tips. This identification
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would result from training, trust, and a communal dedication to identifying
individuals at risk.
Additionally, an examination of Muslim inmates who turn towards violent
behavior when released from prison will widen the known reach of radicalization
within prison and its effects when released from prison. This goes along the basis
of a web crawling system for probation officers and task force officers to use on
released offenders. Again, probation officers would be the primary responders to
these types of intelligence gathering that would lead to targeting larger networks
of radicalized individuals.

Cluster Analysis Significant Findings
The cluster analysis indicated a total of four clusters dependent of a case
detail variable: terrorist affiliation and nine offender characteristic variables. The
results of the cluster analysis support the study’s hypotheses. The four groups of
offenders that shared case details and offender characteristics were: 1) Internet
Radicals, 2) Deviant Associates, 3) Trained Jihadists, and 4) Mobile Lone
Wolves. A second set of clusters, the typology of homegrown terrorists, resulted
from the case detail variable: event type and eight offender characteristic
variables. Those groups were Cyber Attackers, Convert Affiliates, and Trained
Allies. As expected, these groups did not concur with Thachuk et al.’s (2008)
three categories of homegrown terrorists: legal or illegal, second and third
generation Muslims, and converts to Islam (p. 2). Instead, the groups discovered
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in the study were similar and distinct in regards to marital status, foreign travel
activity, and radicalization factors. These sharing characteristics among the
groups presented policy implications from effective web-crawling software and
stringent travel procedures.
Terrorist Affiliation
The first cluster of offenders with multiple Internet-based radicalization
channels resembles Alexander’s (2011) analysis of homegrown jihadist terrorists
that have been trained online yet with no formal terrorist training. This was also
the case with this cluster of offenders who were radicalized by jihadist material
and social networking sites online but yet had no direct communication or formal
terrorist training. Due to the significant radicalization through extremist material
and social networking mechanisms available through the Internet, an effective
web-crawling program that will interdict not only those central nodes of extremist
material but also the terrorist officials or member nodes that facilitate networking
among prospective terrorist individuals. As a result, a filtration system such as a
web-crawler would identify a number of key words to target popular extremist
websites in order to remove them from the Internet. A successful web-crawling
system would be key in disrupting the multiplicity of YouTube accounts
publishing jihadist material as indicated by Klausen et al.’s (2012) study that
revealed 41 jihadist YouTube accounts to be interconnected.
Second, the foreign travel activity of homegrown terrorists, both U.S.
citizens and non-U.S. citizens and their interaction with terrorist officials suggests
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a more stringent travel policy. A pre-screening and a series of questions should
be made, similar to when foreign nationals are in the process of being granted a
visa for temporary visits. Such factors are considered before a foreign national is
granted permission to visit the United States: the purpose of the trip, the
individual’s intent to depart the United States after their trip; and/or the
individual’s ability to pay all costs of the trip. The answers to these questions will
give insight to the true motives and reasons of why those individuals want to
travel to those destinations and therefore be able to prevent travel when feasible.
Moreover, the individuals who are less suspicious to the community and law
enforcement; those with legitimate jobs blend in with the rest of society and this
may help them to pursue their terrorist agendas.
A pre-screening in which the individuals’ Internet activity is monitored to
see if he or she has had a pattern of accessing jihadist material on the Internet
would aid detection of at risk individuals. This type of web screening can also be
done when individuals are being considered for a visa approval from the United
States. In addition, the United States would work closely not only with equivalent
Department of State officials in those destination countries but also American
consulates, if present in those countries. This global effort would effectively
detect supporters who may be conspiring with others abroad, recruiting abroad,
and receiving operational support abroad as well. Nonetheless, this type of
screening and collaboration efforts would prevent radicalized individuals from
gaining further terrorist influence and support overseas.
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Since the offenders in the second set of clusters had some college
education, prevention outreaches at school institutions would also guide the
student body and faculty in detecting these students. Schools often have some
kind of restrictions on the content that can be accessed on the Internet while on
school premises. Internet surveillance is needed to prevent relationships from
being developed with terrorist officials and recruiters. The school can take further
action by setting up a system that records pings when a student attempts to
access extremist propaganda and social networking sites with violent jihad
content. This record of pings can then be given to law enforcement for
investigation leads and intelligence. These efforts would entail task force working
groups between technician support personnel, police, and various faculty
officials.
The last cluster of the analysis included a group of offenders who were
neither radicalized nor traveled abroad. While these offenders lacked the
operational support abroad and the influencing channels of the other cluster, they
were able to carry out operations in support of terrorist organizations and plotted
against the United States. This cluster can be closely aligned to Thachuk et al.’s
(2008) third category, which consists of converts to Islam. Therefore, this cluster
needs to be interdicted at a domestic level in which converts unite to worship the
violent perspective of Islam. This group of offenders held unskilled jobs and
some, while few, had a presence of negative experiences. Those who had
negative experiences might have been the reason for turning to Islam in order to
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find more positive life experiences, as indicated by Agnew’s (1992) general strain
theory.
A Typology of Homegrown Terrorists
The cross-tabulation provided a more in depth description of the three
groups of offenders based on both terrorist affiliation and event type. The
comparison signaled three main groups of offenders who should be the primary
targets for interdiction and prevention of future terrorist activity. Those three
groups of offenders were Cyber Attackers, Convert Affiliates, and Trained Allies.
First, the comparison signaled a group that was exactly the same in both models:
Cyber Attackers. This suggests there is, in fact, a unique group of offenders that
are successful at providing material support to terrorism without direct affiliation
from a terrorist organization. This research indicates that policy should be
targeting these individuals through both a domestic and international approach,
mainly through a monitoring and web-crawling policy since offenders are gaining
Internet-based support, some of which derives from videos and other
propaganda created by terrorist organizations.
The second group on the other hand, Convert Affiliates, is a group with
mixed characteristics such as some college education, lack of web-based
radicalization, no overseas travel, and conversion to Islam. These supporters
pose a major threat to the homeland due to their close ties to terrorist
organizations. Since these offenders do not conduct any international travel and
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are not active on the Internet, their religious ties and college peers need to be
examined. Specifically, these offenders primarily funded terrorist organizations.
The third group of offenders, which were both plotters and attackers who
pose yet a different threat that, may be more difficult to prevent and detect than
the others. These individuals were more highly educated, held U.S. citizenship,
and traveled overseas for foreign training. Due to the lack of foreign nationality
and radicalization, surveillance is difficult. Therefore, more stringent interdiction
and surveillance of individual’s monetary activity is needed. In depth investigation
is needed when large amounts of money are being deposited, withdrawn, or
transferred within accounts.
Law enforcement should not limit themselves on the array of civil and
criminal penalties when individuals violate existing financial rules and regulations.
Suspicious activity reports at financial institutions are already generated but not
sufficient. Further, increased taxation on some of the materials, such as precursor chemicals bought by supporters and plotters may make it less likely for
offenders to illicit funds and property since it will be at a higher cost. Lastly, task
force officers can work in conjunction with the chemical industry, including
manufactures and distributors, to detect offenders who attempt to purchase such
materials for terrorist activity.
Future research would ideally examine groups of terrorist individuals
based on the shared characteristics found in the clusters. As already discussed,
additional research is needed to examine the vast amounts of available extremist
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propaganda on the Internet and the number of individuals accessing that material
on a day to day basis. In addition, travel patterns of terrorist offenders would be
examined to infiltrate terrorist organizations present in those countries of interest.

Limitations of the Study
There were several limitations in this study. First, there were significant
variations in the availability, accuracy, and depth of information from case to
case. The availability and quality of information often depended on such factors
as the scope and level of advancement of the plot and whether the plot was
actually executed. For instance, an advanced plot or a completed attack
generally resulted in a greater dissemination of information owing to the
expanded focus by prosecutors and the news media. These cases often become
high profile cases. High profile cases that were prosecuted through lengthy trials
were more popular among different media outlets allowing the researcher access
to more disseminated information.
Trials are not only lengthy, but often result in more information disclosed
and publicity in the media than those in which pleas are entered. Those cases in
which the offender underwent a trial produced more information about the
offense and the defendant’s background, radicalization, and operative modes
versus those who plead guilty to the charges. Those cases that did not result in
trials due to plea agreements, such as offenses of material support to terrorism
yielded less information than the aforementioned. Moreover, because of national
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security issues, prosecutors may intentionally dispose of cases by plea bargains
to limit media access or information dissemination. This may limit the external
generalization of the study findings.
The typology generated is more apt to apply to individuals involved in high
profile cases that are involved in more advanced plots or are successful in
executing their attacks. However, since the study also tracked unsuccessful plots
and instances of material support to terrorism, a greater variation in offender
characteristics was found than what prior research has found. It is important to
note that the defendants’ capability, risks, and operational expertise varied
significantly. Thus, the variation in offender characteristics revealed during this
study provides a wider insight to the type of offenders involved in homegrown
terrorism.
Another limitation of the study was the availability of information for
specific details of the offenders’ background, specifically marital status, number
of children, mental condition, former military experience, and conversion to Islam.
Information for these variables were found to only be available when the offender
did, in fact, have a spouse, children, a mental condition, former military
experience, and was a convert to Islam. It was found that the varying news
outlets specifically stated the presence of these variables only when it was
known about the offender. On the contrary, if the offender was not married, did
not have children, etc., it was not clearly stated in the news reports.
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Similarly, the same problem arose with the means of radicalization and
strain variables. This information was again only clearly stated when the
defendant was, in fact, radicalized or experienced some type of strain in his or
her life. Instances in which the offender did not become radicalized or
experienced strain, was not noted in the court documents and news articles. The
researcher had to assume an absence of radicalization and strain when it was
not noted in the sources being used. While this information was found to be
inconsistent among the participants of the study, the cluster analysis indicated
significant findings involving these characteristics that are useful for future
studies.
Another variable that was problematic was reported mental illness of
offender. For example, information about an offender’s mental condition is less
available than simple demographic details such as age and ethnicity affiliation.
The mental illness variable was also difficult to analyze because it is likely that
many defendants with mental conditions failed to seek or receive mental health
care. Second, some mental conditions may not meet the legal criteria, and thus
may not be fully examined in a trial or plea agreement. Insanity is a legal
designation, not a psychiatric one. As a result, there may be a greater number of
people who experience psychiatric distress without that information being
uncovered at trial. Moreover, the offenders’ mental illnesses may not be revealed
until they are undergoing criminal proceedings, therefore the information may be
present but unavailable.
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While it was the case that some of the offenders’ mental illnesses were
uncovered until their arrest and during their criminal proceedings, there were, in
fact, cases in which mental illness was present. While the data set may not be
complete for all the cases, specifically reported mental illness, the variables
examined presented significant correlations with other offender characteristics.
Although limitations were uncovered during the course of this study, the
findings contribute to the growing research efforts on homegrown terrorism and
the individuals involved in terrorist operations. Moreover, this study presented a
working typology of homegrown terrorists that can be used in future research.
The typology offers a basis in classifying homegrown terrorists within the United
States and policy for prevention and detection of homegrown terrorism.
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APPENDIX A
TERROR PLOTS INCREASING
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Figure 1. Terror Plots Increasing

Figure 1. The Number of terrorist plots and attacks, by year, from 2001 to 2013.
Zuckerman, J., Bucci, S. P., & Carafano, J. J. (2013). 60 terrorist plots since
9/11: Continued lessons in domestic counterterrorism. Retrieved from
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/60-terrorist-plots-since911-continued-lessons-in-domestic-counterterrorism
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LIST OF VARIABLES
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Case Details
Offense Type

Terrorist organization
affiliation
Number of offenders
involved
Number of coconspirators involved
Number of coconspirators who are
non-U.S. persons
Offender Characteristics

Type of case committed by offender(s), coded: 1=
Material Support to Terrorism/Conspiracy to Provide
Material Support to Terrorism, 2=Plot to Attack, 3 =
Attempted Attack, 4 = Successful Attack.
Specific terrorist organization affiliated with offense,
coded: 1 = Al Qaeda, 2 = Other, 3 = None.
Number of offenders involved in the offense, coded
as a count variable.
Number of co-conspirators involved in the offense,
coded as a count variable.
Number of co-conspirators involved in the offense,
who do not hold any American citizenship, coded as
a count variable.

Demographics
Age at time of arrest
Gender/Sex
Citizenship Status

Immigrant generation

Ethnicity affiliation
Education (highest
achieved)

Occupation (most
recent)

Age of the offender, coded by years old.
Dummy variable coded 1 if male, 0 if female.
A scale based on degree of legal American
citizenship status, coded: 1 = U.S. Citizen (U.S.
born), 2 = Naturalized U.S. citizen (non-U.S. born), 3
= Legal Permanent Resident (LPR), 4 = Visa holder
(ex: student visa), 5 = Undocumented (illegally
residing in the country).
Offender’s generation level of immigrating to the
United States, coded: 1 = 3rd generation, 2 = 2nd
generation, 3 = 1st generation.
String variable, recoding the ethnic affiliation as a
social/cultural group or nation of origin.
Offender’s highest achieved education, coded: 1 =
less than high school, 2 = completed high school, 3 =
technical school, non-college, 4 = some college, 5 =
completed college (BA/BS), 6 = some graduate
school, 7 = completed graduate school (M.A.), 8 =
some/completed Doctorate (Ph.D.)
Offender’s most recent occupational status, coded: 1
= Professional (physicians, architect, teachers), 2 =
Semi-Skilled (police, military, mechanics, small
business owners, and students), 3 = Unskilled/None
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Reported Marital status
at the time of the
offense/arrest
Reportedly have
children

Dummy variable coded 1 if married/common law, 0 if
single, unmarried, separated/divorced.
Dummy variable coded 1 if offender has one or more
children, 0 if no children.

Social
Reported religious
affiliation
Reported former military
involvement/training
Reported mental
condition

Reported
radicalization/influence
to terrorism via the
Internet
Reported
radicalization/influence
to terrorism via social
networking sites (ex:
Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, etc.)
Reported
radicalization/influence
to terrorism via
extremist propaganda
(online, print) (ex:
Inspire magazine,
RevolutionMuslim.com)
Reported
radicalization/influence
to terrorism via email or
direct contact with
terrorist officials

String variable
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.
A scale computed by summing offender’s reported
suffering from diagnosed/suspected mental condition,
coded 1 = mental condition, 0 = no mental condition.
1) mental health issues, mentally troubled, mentally
ill, 2) schizophrenia, 3) hallucinations, 4) bipolar
disorder, 5) depression, 6) anxiety, 7) Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD)
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.

Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.

Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.

Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.
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Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.
Reported
radicalization/influence
to terrorism via overseas
training with terrorist
organizations
Strain variables
Failure to achieve
positive valued goals:

A scale computed by summing offender’s failure to
achieve the following positive valued goals, coded: 1
= event occurred, 0 = event did not occur.
1) acquisition of wealth, 2) status and respect, 3)
autonomy

Loss of positive valued
stimuli (i.e. positive
experiences or
acquisitions):

A scale computed by summing offender’s loss of the
following positive valued stimuli, coded 1 = event
occurred, 0 = event did not occur.
1) death of friend/romantic partner, 2) divorce, 3)
separation, 4) theft of a valued object, 5) loss of a
good job, 6) loss of the use of a car for a period of
time
A scale computed by summing offender’s
presentation of the following negative stimuli, coded 1
= event occurred, 0 = event did not occur.
1) abusive parent, 2) boss who puts undue strain on
individual, 3) parental unemployment, 4) deaths in the
family, 5) illness in the family, 6) homelessness, 7)
economic hardship/poverty

The presentation of
negative stimuli (i.e.
negative experiences or
loss):

Behavioral
Reported Criminal
record
Offender type
Role of offender within
group
Reported Imam leader
Reported international
travel
Instrumentality

Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.
Method in which terrorist offense was committed,
coded: 1 if acted alone, 2 if acted in a group.
Dummy variable coded 1 if leader, 2 if non-leader
(group member).
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.
Instrumentality involved in offense, coded: 1 =
weapons (ex: handguns, WMD), 2 = general
supplies, 3 = explosives, 4 = safe houses and support
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Convert to Islam/Muslim
Prior Religion

(ex: target lists, passports, driver’s license,
surveillance, etc.), 5 = funding, 6 = jihad training, 7 =
multiple instrumentalities
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.
Religion prior to converting to Islam/Muslim, coded as
a string variable.
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